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ABSTRACT

Because o f recent failures, the AICPA Banking Committee has developed a
normative model citing specific variables for auditors to use in bank audits. This research
has examined that AICPA model.
In addition, the Auditing Principles Board has identified several areas o f concern
for auditing internal control structures. Research into size and regulation from other
sources has indicated that both are significant modifiers o f financial models. Regulations
now require banks and holding companies of more than $500 million in assets to submit
to an annual independent audit.
The primary purpose of this research was to determine whether the AICPA
normative model should be expanded to include size and regulation as explanatory
variables for loan losses in national banks. A secondary purpose was to explore the
economy of scale enigma in banking. A final purpose was to examine the AICPA model
to determine which identified variables were statistically significant in explaining loan
losses.
Analysis o f covariance indicated that size and regulation did not interact to produce
varying levels o f effects on loan losses. In addition, a study o f the financial information
for 236 banks revealed that regulation has no significant impact on bank loan losses. No
apparent difference was determined between different size holding companies.
iii
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The

conclusion was made that regulation requiring audits for banks could not be confirmed as
explaining a difference in loan loss determination.
Analysis o f covariance indicated that size was a significant influence in explaining
loan losses. A significant difference in loan losses was determined between small and
medium national banks in this study.
This difference was further explored to reveal that medium banks had larger loan
losses than small banks. This diseconomy o f scale is inconsistent with most, but not all,
previous research in this area.
Seven o f the AICPA model variables, consumer loans, lagged loan losses, non
accruing loans, management quality, changes in construction loans, consumer loans and
non-accruing loans, were found to be significant influencing loan losses. In addition, a
significant trend variable indicated that the model has missing elements that have not yet
been determined.

iv
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

As the turbulent decade o f the 1980s came to an end, the banking industry had
been shaken to its core. During this period, more banks failed than at any time since the
Great Depression.1 Regulators and Congressmen have raised questions concerning the
circumstances surrounding these failures. Combined bailout costs for both the banking and
thrift industries have been projected by the General Accounting Office (GAO) to reach
nearly $500 billion.2 While no one has any doubt that the taxpayer will ultimately bear
the brunt of this debacle, some bank managers are seeking to find legal remedies to address
these failures. When ambiguities exist as to potential blame for failed institutions, the
insured independent auditor is the one most likely to be sued for damages. How did the
public accounting profession find itself in this predicament?

'Sinkey (1998, 726) reported 490 additional failures occurred between 1934 and 1942. In
contrast, Amos (1992, 805) found that the FDIC closed 831 banks between 1980 and 1988. Sheshunoff
(1994,1.55) asserted that an additional 365 banks were closed in 1989 and 1990.
’McConnell (1996, 3) stated the projection by the GAO and claimed that 87% will be coming
from taxpayers' pockets.

1
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Issues Involved in the Valuation
o f Bank Loans
A large portion of bank auditing involves evaluating bank lending practices. If
poor lending practices exist, the auditor must recognize the low probability of loan
collection and devalue the loan portfolio accordingly. As part of this procedure, bank
auditors examine the allowance for loan losses (ALL). The purpose o f the ALL is to
estimate loan losses needed to reduce the loan portfolio to an amount that is expected to
be collected. Knapp (1996,89) concluded that the ALL "is typically the most problematic
account to audit in banking and savings and loan engagements."
The importance of the ALL was illustrated in the collapse of the Penn Square Bank
in 1982. This failure occurred partially as a result of poor estimates of the ALL by KPMG
Peat Marwick LLP.

Losses of $2 billion were estimated from this failure. Knapp

( 1 9 9 6 , 88) reported that Peat Marwick ultimately paid $45 million to the FDIC and
$186 million to settle this and other suits resulting from their "allegedly negligent audits
o f several banks and savings and loans."
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Committee on
Banking and the Auditing Standards Division (1986) immediately reacted to the dilemma
and partially addressed the problem by publishing an auditing procedural study designed
to serve as guidance in auditing the credit losses o f banks. Auditing procedural studies are
Category B sources for generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).3

3See Delaney, Adler, Epstein, and Foran (1998, 4-6) for a discussion of GAAP hierarchy as
defined by the Auditing Standards Board in SAS 69.
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One aspect o f this publication defines a normative model for auditors to follow
when auditing the ALL. This paper examines the adequacy of the AICPA model in
explaining loan losses.
In addition, two additional variables were tested as part o f an analysis o f
covariance model to determine if the explanatory power is increased by their presence.
These variables, bank size and regulatory requirements, are part of the banking internal
control environment suggested by Statements on Auditing Standards (SAS) #55 (1989,
260).

Size has also been suggested to lend an economy o f scale to the banking

environment. As a backdrop for the problem, the issue o f bad debt expense estimation for
banks is placed in historical perspective.

Banking Audit History
The Industrial Revolution forever changed business operation in America. Prior
to the 19th century, most companies were managed by the owner(s). As companies
progressed in size and complexity, company owners hired stewards to manage their firms.
Auditing, as a separate accounting function, grew out o f a perceived need by owners to
evaluate the stewardship o f those agents. As the corporate style of ownership increased,
the demand for accountability was extended as well. The audit function was an extension
of this demand.
The banking industry lagged the industrial environment in the demand for auditors
because of special circumstances. The first circumstance revolved around the fact that
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most banks prior to 1930 were privately held firms. As such, there was little or no demand
for audits from stockholders or investors.
Regulation o f the banking industry began to increase as the dominant bank business
form changed slowly from partnerships and closely held firms to publicly traded
corporations. This effect was intensified as a result o f the stock market crash of 1929.
The Securities Exchange Act o f 1934 created the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) with oversight authority over these corporations. One of the first SEC regulations
required audits of financial statements for publicly traded corporations.
The second circumstance that initially slowed the demand for audited financial
services was the radical differences between banking industry practices and generally
accepted accounting practices (GAAP).

Savage (1973) noted that because of these

differences, auditors were generally precluded from expressing an unqualified opinion
upon the financial statements o f most banks.
In 1964, the Federal Reserve (FED) and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) changed banking industry practice by requiring that GAAP be
followed more closely in banking practice. In addition, auditing standards began to allow
for exceptions to GAAP because o f industry standards. As auditing standards changed,
an increasingly larger number o f banks began to be audited. From that change, Savage
(1973, 5) could report that "by 1971, a majority o f the first hundred largest banks had
independent audits." Savage continued to note that in 1971, the SEC "required for the
first time opinion audits of bank holding companies and their consolidated subsidiaries"
( 8).
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The banking environment began deregulation in the late 1970s as public policy
changed with the intention of increasing competition between financial institutions. With
the passage o f (1) The Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act o f
1978, (2) The International Banking Act o f 1978, (3) The Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act o f 1980, and (4) The Gam-St Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982, the lending industry was substantially deregulated.
Boyd and Gertler (1994, 2) partially attributed the bank failures that occurred
during the 1980s upon the deregulated environment created by these enactments. Jeffrey,
Norris, and Witowski (1992, 20) concurred and added two additional factors by stating:
While loan portfolio strength has always been a critical determinant of financial
condition, the importance of loan evaluation judgment has been magnified by
economic conditions of the 1980s, by deregulation, and by management quality
concerns.
The deregulated environment created by these new laws helped to ignite the large
numbers of bank and S&L failures during the decade o f the 1980s. Jeffrey, et al. further
stated, "Recent lawsuits have alleged that auditors have failed to detect material
overstatements o f the value of bank loan portfolios" (20). Lys and Watts (1994, 76)
reported 207 lawsuits were filed against auditors during this era, representing 42 percent
o f all lawsuits filed against auditors between 1956 and 1994.
Goldwasser (1995, 21) reported: "Cases against accounting firms have consisted
largely o f claims arising out of the S&L crisis, plus the usual post-recession claims
consisting of suits arising out of failed bank loans . . . ." Goldwasser contended that
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auditors would be more capable of defending themselves against liability lawsuits if
proposed tort reform was enacted.
In 1995, Congress passed and subsequently overrode a presidential veto to enact
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act o f 1995 (H.R. 1689). King (1997, 101-2)
reported that this act mitigates auditor liability by (1) discouraging abusive claims by
investors, (2) providing more protection against securities fraud, and (3) creating safe
harbors for auditors who utilize pro forma statements.

1986 Tax Reform Act and Loan Losses
In the middle of this decade of bank failure, Congress revised the Tax Code. The
1986 Tax Reform Act (86 TRA) (subsequently, the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) had
many effects on business in the United States and was particularly adverse to the banking
industry. One area o f banking affected by the 86 TRA was the recognition o f loan losses
and the maintenance o f a loan loss reserve as part of the core capital o f a bank.
Walter (1991, 20) stated that all federal banking regulators "require that all banks
include in their financial statements an account named allowance for loan losses (ALL)"
which is used to absorb loan losses both from loans currently identified as bad and from
apparently good loans that may go bad later. Conway and Siegenthaler (1987,8) reported
that the loan loss reserve was used "to enable a bank to absorb all future loan losses
relative to its loan portfolio without impairing capital."
Prior to passage o f the 86 TRA, all banks could use either a percentage o f loan
losses up to a set ceiling for the reserve (percentage method) or a six-year experience
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moving average (experience method) to estimate their loan losses recognizable for tax
purposes. The 1986 Tax Code revision required large banks or large holding companies
(LHC's) with $500 million plus in total assets to deduct only the extent of actual chargeoffs (specific charge-off method). All other banks and small holding companies (SHC's)
were allowed to use either the percentage method or the experience method for tax
recognition of loan losses.4
A conflict emerged after passage o f the 86 TRA because o f divergent interests of
two regulatory agencies, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the U.S. Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC). The IRS wanted adherence to the 86 TRA specific charge-off
method, while the OCC wanted to rely on a tax concept which allowed regulators to
determine that a charge-off was authorized and thus allowable (conclusive presumption).
Von Storch (1992, 17) reported that to resolve the dispute, the Tax Code was amended3
to state that a "debt charged-off for regulatory purposes is conclusively presumed to have
become worthless for tax purposes the same year." Thus, loan loss expense determination
became a matter o f regulation, rather than tax law.

Regulation and Size Theory
In several instances (notably the 86 TRA and the 1991 FDIC Improvement Act),
banking regulations have had differential impacts upon banks because of arbitrary size

4IRC Section 585(b)(1)(A).
SIRC Section 166.
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specification by regulators and Congress. Why have regulators decided that banks should
be treated differently because of their size?
With the failure of the Continental Illinois Bank in 1984, the Comptroller o f the
Currency propounded a new policy that stated that some 11 bank holding companies were
"too-big-to-fail."6 The origin of this policy began in the Depression era when failures of
large banks were observed to be contagious. O'Hara and Shaw (1990, 1599) presented
evidence that this policy was extended to more than the original 11 bank holding
companies. Boyd and Gertler (1994, 2) found that this policy subsidized risk-taking by
large banks.
Apparently, regulators also were influenced by early research suggesting that an
economy o f scale existed in the banking industry which allowed larger banks to absorb the
additional costs imposed by regulatory statutes. McEachem (1990, 51) stated: "Size is an
advantage in delivering financial services to the public because it takes a significant
investment in both product development and data processing capability to stay competitive
in today’s market."

Regulation and Holding Company Effect
Another topic o f interest in banking research has been the change in the business
form of banks. As previously reported, the history o f bank ownership began as a small
group of investors chartering and managing a bank. As the banking industry began to
grow and prosper after the 1929 Depression, two distinct patterns of operation became

‘In September 1984, The Comptroller of the Currency testified to Congress that 11 bank holding
companies were "too big to fail."
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evident. One method that evolved was the use of branch banking in which a large bank
placed small banking units in dispersed geographical locations around the central unit. The
main purpose o f this decentralization was to reduce competitive pressure by preventing
other banks from starting operations in the branch bank area.
The second method evolved because of state regulation that forbid branch banking
in part or in total. In these states, independent banks joined together as holding companies
to compete more effectively with larger banks. Sinkey (1998, 9) reported that the rapid
expansion o f this type of ownership resulted in 93 percent o f all bank deposits being held
by bank holding companies.
With the inflow o f capital into these holding company banks, federal regulatory
intervention was inevitable. Sinkey (1998, 675) reported that the federal government
moved to regulate these multi-bank holding companies with The Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956. In 1979, this Act was amended to bring single bank holding companies into
the regulatory fold.
The regulatory effect increased with the passage of 1991 FDIC Improvement Act.
One of the main intentions of this legislation was to improve accountability o f large banks
and large holding companies. As such, banks and bank holding companies with total
assets larger than $500 million were required to have audited annual financial statements.

Size. Regulation, and the AICPA
As part o f audit planning, the auditor should examine the internal control structure
of the organization being audited. The knowledge gained from this examination allows the
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firm to set the control risk and the level to which it will rely on the control structure. The
Auditing Standards Board in writing SAS #55, stated that size and regulatory requirements
are part of the control environment o f an organization (AICPA, 1989, 260). As such, the
auditor should consider them in his/her7 assessment of internal controls. The research
question to be answered is why did the Banking Committee omit these items from
consideration for auditing the ALL?

Normative Theory and the AICPA
Model
The AICPA interest in bank auditing resulted in the printing of three bank audit
procedural guides in 1968, 1983, and 1992. In addition, the Institute has also published
one procedural study for auditing the allowance for loan losses in 1986. When writing
these guides, the Banking Committee (1992, ii) attempted to "provide practitioners with
non-authoritative practical assistance concerning auditing procedures."
In banking, procedures evolved from observations o f business practices. Bankers
noticed that defaulted loans have certain characteristics. From these observations, bankers
and bank regulators deduced factors that influence loan loss. From these observations, the
AICPA Committee on Banking (1986,13-14) formulated a normative model which stated
that in establishing the scope of the work to be performed, the following factors should be
considered by the CPA:
1. composition o f the loan portfolio,

7All pronouns will refer to both genders from this point forward.
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2. identified potential problem loans, including loans classified by bank regulatory
agencies,
3. trends in loan volume by major categories, especially categories experiencing rapid
growth, and in delinquencies, nonaccrual, and restructured loans,
4. previous loss and recovery experience, including timeliness o f charge-offs,
5. concentrations o f loans to individuals and their related interests, industries, and
geographic regions,
6. size o f individual credit exposures (few, large loans versus numerous, small loans),
7. degree o f reliance placed on internal loan review and internal audit functions,
8. total amount of loans and problem loans, including delinquent and nonaccrual loans,
by officer,
9. lending, charge-off, collection, and recovery policies and procedures,
10. local, national, and international economic and environmental conditions,
11. experience, competence, and depth of lending management and staff,
12. results of regulatory examinations, and
13. related party lending.
From an examination o f these factors, the Committee must have been heavily
influenced by finance literature, particularly portfolio theory. Modem portfolio theory
(MPT) allows bankers to reduce the loan loss risk by diversifying their loan portfolio over
the broad spectrum o f loan types, as well as geographical dispersement.
Komar (1993, 31) reported that "the most common problem leading to excessive
loan losses is the over concentration of lending exposure to a risky or poorly performing
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industry." Bennett (1984, 1S5) reported that "regulators and management both tend to
favor a well-diversified loan portfolio to reduce the risks o f the bank failing." Bankers
became acquainted with the concept of portfolio diversification from the works o f Sharpe
(1964) or Fama and Miller (1972). Bennett (1984, 153-5) proposed that MPT allows
banks to determine the risk premium and price their loans accordingly.
The model proposed by the Banking Committee apparently attempted to develop
normative accounting theory using MPT. Normative accounting theory has been defined
by Hendriksen (1982, 56) as "starting from an observation of existing procedures or o f
business practices." Hendriksen (1982, 1) also stated that "all theories are subject to
modification o f abandonment with the development o f new information" since accounting
theory "guide[s] the development of new practices and procedures." Thus, if other factors
are found to explain the ALL more adequately, the AICPA model should be modified to
account for this improvement.
In addition, the AICPA model has incorporated the use of economic variables. A
direct relationship appears to exist between the state of the economy and bank failures.
As the economy worsens, the number of failed banks tends to increase because o f
increased loan losses. Conversely, Chirinko & Guill (1991, 785) reported "the amount o f
risk faced by depository institutions is of substantial concern for policy-makers because
of the perceived link between their stability and the performance of the economy."
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Statement o f the Problem
Because audit failures result in large dollar court judgements against audit firms,
more effective audit techniques must be developed. The area that has had the largest
impact on bank failure has been loan losses. This study analyzes the ways that loan losses
have been estimated both in the past and present in an effort to extend a normative audit
model proposed by the AICPA. An attempt was made to determine whether differences
in loan losses exist between national banks o f different sizes and under different
regulations. The study posed the following research questions:
1.

Does regulation affect loan loss recognition in national banks? This question was
addressed by the following:
A.

Does a difference exist in loan losses between small SHC member banks and
small LHC member banks?

B.

Is there a difference in loan losses between medium SHC member banks and
medium LHC member banks?

2.

Is there a difference in loan loss recognition by national banks within LHC's due to
bank size? This question was addressed by the following:
Is there a difference in loan loss recognition between small and medium LHC
member banks?

3.

Is there a difference in loan loss recognition by national banks within SHC’s due to
bank size? This question was addressed by the following:
Is there a difference in loan loss recognition between small and medium SHC
member banks?
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4.

Do loan loss recognition differences translate into economies or diseconomies of
scale in small and medium banks? This question was addressed by the following:

5.

A.

Are loan losses o f small banks larger than those o f medium banks?

B.

Are loan losses of small banks smaller than those o f medium banks?

Do size and regulation interact in the determination o f loan losses in national banks?
This question was addressed by the following:
Is there a difference in loan loss recognition between small LHC member banks
and medium SHC member banks?

6.

Do the variables suggested by the AICPA Banking Committee explain loan losses in
national banks? This question was addressed by the following:
Are the suggested variables statistically significant in explaining loan losses?

Purpose o f the Study
The primary purpose o f this study was to determine whether size and regulation help
explain loan losses in national banks. A secondary purpose was to determine whether
economies or diseconomies o f scale exist in banking. A third purpose was to investigate
whether the factors in a normative model proposed by the AICPA helped explain loan
losses in national banks.

Sources of Data
Primary data used in this study was collected from two database sources. The first
source was SheshunofFs The Bank Quarterly: Ratines and Analysis, which is published
quarterly by Sheshunoff s Information Service. This journal contains quarterly financial
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data about each insured bank obtained by tabulating the Reports o f Call required by FDIC
regulations o f all insured banks.
The second source was the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. This governmental
agency collects economic data in many different formats. The collected data are assembled
in flat files in a database known as LABSTAT.* The Bureau of Labor Statistics breaks
down the employment and unemployment figures into several different demographic
divisions. The division proposed in this study was the unemployment percentages in each
county.
Secondary sources o f data were books, journals, pamphlets, and government
documents from libraries and government archives.

These sources were used as

background and historical data.

Methods and Procedures for Collection
and Treatment o f Data
The population of national charter banks in 1992 was comprised o f 3691 banks,9
the majority o f which were owned by holding companies. Compact Disclosure10 was
utilized to identify the holding company affiliation o f publicly traded banks.
A further refinement o f the population was the exclusion o f large banks. These
banks were defined as having more than $500 Million in total assets. Large banks were

*The Bureau of Labor Statistics is listed on the Internet at the following:
URL:http://stats.bls.gov/blshome.html.
’Compiled by Polk’s Bank Directory (1992, VIE).
l0Compact Disclosure is a relational database that provides information on all publicly traded
companies that follow SEC guidelines.
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excluded in part because o f the large differences between their types o f operations and
those of small and medium banks. In addition, large banks may add a confounding factor
to the study because o f the large percentage of their loan portfolio committed to foreign
loans. Since the vast majority o f small and medium banks limit their business sphere to the
national market, a bias might have been introduced into the study if large banks were
included. Other sources used to identify population units were Moody's Bank & Finance
Manual. SheshunofFs The Bank Quarterly: Ratines & Analysis, and Polk's Bank
Directory.

Data Collection
From Compact Disclosure and Moody's Bank and Finance Manual, two lists o f
publicly traded bank holding companies were assembled. One list entitled Large Holding
Companies (LHC) was comprised o f holding companies that owned more than $500
Million in total assets. The other list, identified as Small Holding Companies (SHC),
contained holding companies which owned $500 Million in total assets or less. Individual
banks were identified as belonging to each type holding company. These banks were
segregated into two classes: (1) small banks having less than $100 Million in total assets
and (2) medium banks having between $100 Million and $500 Million inclusive in total
assets.
A random selection of 59 banks was drawn from each subgroup of size and
affiliation grouping. This number represented at least 20 percent o f the number within
each group and assured adequate sample size for statistical testing.
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Treatment of Data
The collected data were tabulated into a database and examined for standard
statistical measurements o f central tendency and dispersion (see Appendix I). As part of
this procedure, the data were examined for outliers. Two observations were identified as
obvious outliers, which were determined to be misplaced decimal places and corrected.
In addition, tests of normality indicated significant departures from normal
distributions. Since nonnormally distributed data can lead to incorrect conclusions in
inferential statistical analysis and may bias the correlation coefficients, Conover (1980,
337) suggested the use o f rank transformation as a way to correct partially for this defect.
Therefore, the data were ranked to mitigate the nonnormal nature o f the distribution.

Methodology
One purpose o f this research was to determine if differences existed in loan loss
recognition due to size and regulation in the presence o f the factors suggested by the
AICPA normative model.

To accomplish this goal, rank analysis of covariance

(ANCOVA) was the most appropriate statistical procedure to perform hypothesis testing
on the sample data.
Quade (1967,1198-1200) first recognized that an analysis o f covariance performed
on ranks was fairly efficient even in the absence o f the usual ANOVA assumptions when
used with large samples. Puri and Sen (1969,617-18) analytically proved that Quade was
correct by establishing that ranked ANCOVA results were relatively efficient compared
to the classic parametric test results. Conover and Iman (1981, 127) state that these
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procedures "may be more robust and powerful than their competitors in non-normal
situations."

Assumptions
In any study, certain parameters must be set and suppositions made. The following
assumption, limitations and delimitations define those areas.
A.

The financial data collected from secondary sources was assumed to be
accurate.

Limitations
The limitations of the study were as follows:
1. The study was limited to the extent that the selected banks were representative o f the
total population o f national banks throughout the nation.
2. The changes in banking regulation and economic conditions may have caused
impairment of the interpretation of the results o f the study.
3. The economic conditions that occurred during this study might have biased the results.
Readers are advised that the results could be tainted by these conditions.
4. Some variables suggested by the Banking Committee were bank specific and
constituted proprietary information that could not be elicited from the banks. The
inability to access this data may have caused biased or limited results.
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Delimitations
The delimitations o f the study were as follows:
1. The population from which the sample banks were drawn was limited to banks which
had survived the recession and subsequent high loan loss era o f the late 1980s. Hence,
a survivor bias may have existed among the population.
2. The population from which the sample banks were selected was limited to those banks
that did not change holding company affiliation during the time period o f the study.
Since this era was one in which large numbers o f banks were acquired by holding
companies, a selection bias may have occurred as a result o f this condition.
3. The study encompassed three years: 1991 through 1993. Caution should be used in
interpreting the results of this study because the normal operating cycle o f banks is
five years.11 Thus, the relatively short time span used in this study may have biased
the results.
4. The population was defined as publicly traded national banks. The elimination of
closely held banks from the study may have biased the results.
5. Large banks (over $500 million in total assets) were eliminated from the population.
This delimitation may prevent inferences to be universal in scope.

Significance of the Study
This study was performed to expand normative theory concerning the factors that
auditors should use in examining the ALL of commercial banks. An attempt was made to

“See Austin (1992, 38)
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determine whether a normative model proposed by an AICPA industry audit guide
explains differences in loan loss recognition in the presence o f regulatory and size effects.
In addition, the possible interaction o f regulatory and size effects was explored.
Interest in bank solvency has been highlighted in the last decade by the large
numbers of bank and thrift failures that have occurred. Some public officials and banking
groups have criticized the accounting profession for some o f these failures due to "faulty
audits." As a result o f ensuing litigation, the accounting profession has suffered serious
financial setbacks.
To avoid repeating these costly mistakes, new guidance is needed in planning bank
audits. A better understanding of banking regulations and environment is crucial to
auditors engaged in performing these audits. Old methods and models need to be
reexamined to discern what is useful in the modem dynamic global market. Therefore, this
study examined a normative model for auditing the ALL to evaluate the management
assertion of valuation o f the loan portfolio. In addition, two new factors were added to
the model and their impact was determined.
The accounting rule-making bodies traditionally have procrastinated in making
changes to generally accepted accounting principles and auditing standards. One notable
exception to this tradition has been the AICPA interest in the banking environment which
has resulted in the creation and two amended audit guides for banks.12 In addition, the
AICPA Research Division has shown in the past a particular involvement in auditing the

l2An Industry Audit Guide entitled "Audits of Banks" was written by the AICPA Banking
Committee in 1968 and subsequently revised in 1983 and 1992.
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ALL account by issuing an audit guide specifically for this audit element.13 This study
attempted to illustrate to the profession and the AICPA that a new update for auditing the
ALL account is needed.
Prior research in the area of loan losses has been concerned principally with
predicting future loan losses. Bankruptcy prediction has also been exhaustively examined.
Several methodologies have been used to determine the appropriate amount to place in the
ALL. Another area o f interest has been the use o f loan classification as a means o f
determining loan defaults. The effects o f TRA 86 and governmental regulations on loan
losses have also been explored.14 These topics will be discussed further in Chapter n.
No prior research has been identified that attempted to test whether the model
proposed by the AICPA has any validity. Jordan (1986, 88) found some o f these same
variables to be statistically significant in his predictive study of loan loss reserves. Several
of his variables later appeared in the AICPA model. His study suggested that size might
discriminate loan losses among commercial banks located in Louisiana. However, the
AICPA model did not utilize his conclusion. This research extended Jordan's findings by
adding size and regulation to the AICPA model.

l3The Committee on Banking produced "Auditing the Allowance for Credit Losses of Banks,"
an auditing procedure study, in 1986.
l4See especially McNichols and Wilson (1988), Scheiner (1981), and Beidleman (1973).
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Plan o f the Study
The remaining chapters o f this study will include Chapter n , A Review o f Related
Literature; Chapter m , The Research Design; Chapter IV, Results o f the Study; and
Chapter V, The Summary, Conclusions, and Implications for Future Research.
Seven topics o f research will be covered in Chapter II. These topics consist o f
(1) a review of loan loss methodologies, (2) bankruptcy prediction literature, (3) a
discussion o f economy o f scale, (4) tax implications of loan loss recognition by banks,
(5) loan classification research, (6) governmental regulation, and (7) GAAP recognition
of loan losses.
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CHAPTER H

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

This section examines previous banking research. Special attention is given to the
areas o f loan loss determination, bankruptcy prediction, economy o f scale, tax effects of
TRA on banks, loan classification, governmental regulation of loan loss recognition, and
GAAP recognition of loan losses.
The decade o f the Eighties was exemplified by industrial deregulation. The
banking industry was no exception. It preceded other industries by beginning deregulation
in the late 1970s in response to the inflation o f that era. Holdren, Bowers and Mason
(1994, 290) found this deregulation to have had a significant impact on asset and liability
decomposition in their study on 103 banks.
During the 1970s, prime lending rates exceeded 20 percent, while long-term loans
were locked in at rates under 12 percent. This disparity caused lending rates to soar.
Deregulation of the banking industry allowed S&L’s and other thrifts to compete directly
with banks for depositor funds by permitting checking accounts and certificates of
deposits. These services had been offered only by banks prior to the environmental
change.

23
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In addition, the rate cap on certificates o f deposits (CD’s) was lifted to allow the
interest rates on these deposits to float with the prime rate. The increased competition for
deposits forced banks and S&L’s to offer increasingly higher interest rates for long term
CD rates. Financial institutions paying high CD rates were forced to invest in increasingly
riskier loans as they attempted to recapture their interest payments. With the end of hyper
inflation, the surviving institutions paying these extremely high CD rates were forced to
reevaluate their loan portfolios.
Many financial institutions did not survive the default o f high risk loans made
during the inflationary period. This instability in the banking industry did not go unnoticed
by the banking regulators who noted in the FDIC Annual Report (1983, x) that the
increased competition " . . . has given rise to increased risk and greater opportunities for
banks to fail."
The market instability created by this deregulation allowed banking researchers
great opportunities for exploration. This chapter reviews current research in seven areas
to include (1) a review o f loan loss methodologies, (2) bankruptcy prediction literature,
(3) a discussion o f economy of scale, (4) tax implications o f loan loss recognition by
banks, (5) loan classification methods, (6) governmental regulation, and (7) GAAP
recognition of loan losses. The first area examined is methods for determination of loan
losses.
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Loan Loss Methodologies
Past banking accounting practice has recognized losses from loans prior to the
actual write-off of the loan. This standard accounting practice resulted in an expense
account known as the provision for loan losses and a contra asset account known as the
allowance for loan losses (ALL). Baskin (1992, 95) reported that the GAAP concept
behind the establishment of the ALL is SFAS 5, "Accounting for Contingencies," which
requires "losses to be recognized in the financial statements in the period they occur, not
before or after the loss event."
To accomplish the objectives of SFAS 5, an estimation o f loan loss must be made
from the loan portfolio. This loss increases both the ALL and the loan loss expense for
the year. Researchers and bank officers have examined several methods with the intent of
achieving a better estimation. Some o f the more common types are examined in the
following sections.

Markov Chains
Cyert, Davidson, and Thompson (1962, 296) explored an estimation technique
known as Markov chains to determine the appropriate allowance amount. Markov chains
is a mathematical approach that uses the sum of the variance estimates for each cyclic
repetitive Markov chain to determine an appropriate allowance amount. Markov chain
methodology was described by Orgler (1975, 92) as being too complex and economically
unjustified for routine reviews and examinations.
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Migration Analysis
Migration analysis has also been used to estimate future loan losses. Austin (1992,
38) described this tool as a better way to assess how a bank's loan portfolio changes in
response to economic conditions. He stated that he
. . . used five to seven years' data because this span reflects the economic cycle in
which the bank operates and includes enough data to smooth out distortions from
a particularly good or bad year.
While extremely computer intensive, migration analysis has been shown to establish refined
determinations o f loan losses by tracking and rating the risk o f charge-offs as they occur.
Kosiek (1992, 7) stated that migration analysis is most effective " . . . as it
quantifies the movement o f homogenous loans to and from individual delinquency
categories." However, Weinstein (1992,14) criticized migration analysis because it is "too
dependent on past performance, which might not be a good indicator o f current market
conditions."

Econometric and Regression Models
Econometric modeling and multiple regression appear tc dominate the methods
being employed by most researchers.

Giroux and Rose (1981, 151) found that

econometric models and multiple regression analysis were widely used for quantitative
approaches in predicting economic events.
Graham and Humphrey (1978, 500) investigated the use o f bank examination data
as predictors of bank net loan losses. They analyzed three models to determine which best
explained loan losses for 501 banks segregated for size. The findings o f the study
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indicated that predictive models would need to be different for each size o f bank. This
finding validates that o f Jordan (1986, 135), which stated that size discriminated loan
losses in Louisiana for commercial banks.
Hogan, Frankie, and Merz (1987, 65) performed a descriptive analysis o f 93
variables for a time period o f 42 months in an attempt to determine the factors affecting
loan losses. They stated that "somewhat surprisingly, no previous attempts to build
aggregate loan loss models could be found in the banking literature." Their findings
indicated that a model with four variables lagged six months (loan balances, non-accruals,
initial unemployment claims and non-agricultural employment) explained 83 percent o f the
consumer loan losses. Two of the variables they found to be statistically significant were
used in the current topic; i.e., non-accruals and initial unemployment claims.
Moore (1992) extended the study o f aggregate loan loss determination begun by
Hogan, et al. (1987). Moore addressed the question of aggregate loan loss determination
from an auditor's prospective in exploring the population o f insured small banks (banks
with assets of less than $50 million insured by the FDIC) for the year o f 1986.
Moore found that the three loan areas o f oil and gas, real estate and agriculture
were statistically significant. Management also was found to be highly significant and thus,
was included in the current study as well. However, the model taken as a whole explained
only 18 percent o f the variation in loan losses (118-130).
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O'Connor and Rollauer15 (1988, 34) concluded that in their experience, an
appropriate allowance could be determined by quantitatively examining the following
areas: large classified loans, other classified loans, loan concentrations, portfolio trends,
trends in overdue and nonperforming loans, growth in off-balance-sheet credit risk,
economic conditions, and risk of error due to individual loans and pools o f loans. Loan
concentrations and portfolio trends were found by O'Connor and Rollauer to be significant
and were included in the current research.

Current Practice
Estimating loan losses has tended to be a "gut feel" approach in past banking
practice. Banks either used a set percentage of loans or a modified aging schedule
approach in determining the amount to be written off to expense. Current banking
practice (OCC Banking Circular 201) requires banks to document how the Allowance for
Loan Losses (ALL) was determined.16
In summary, several methods have been explored by various researchers in efforts
to determine loan losses with better precision.

To date, no one method has been

established as a "method o f choice." Lack of computer availability hampered initial

l5Mr. O'Connor was at the time of publication of this article the national audit partner-banking
services for Deloitte Haskins & Sells. Mr. Rollauer was director for bank supervision with the
Comptroller of the Currency.
“OCC B.C. 201 and its supplement, OCC B.C. 201 (Rev.) (Supplement 1), require national
banks to provide for "inherent losses" that probably exit in the loan portfolio. In addition, this loss
estimation should cover only one year's losses. While no particular methodology is specified,
documentation is required. B.C. 201 emphasizes that loan losses should reflect current economic
conditions, loan concentrations, trends in loan volume and terms, changes in loan policies and procedures,
and the experience and depth of the lending staff and management
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research, but technology development has enabled many methods to be used that formerly
were too "computer intensive."

Bankruptcy Prediction Models
One element with which auditors contend is the determination o f whether a "going
concern opinion" is warranted by the financial position of the audit client.17 In essence, an
auditor is predicting the probability that a client is about to become bankrupt. Lynn and
Neyland (1992,49) commented that the key determinants in bankruptcy cases involve the
valuations of assets. These valuation determinations are often the most hotly contested
items in bankruptcy court as well.
Previously, auditors have used ratio analysis to make this going concern
determination.

Altman (1968, 609) stated that statistical analysis is preferred by

academicians to ratio analysis.

Several researchers have used various models and

statistical methodologies to make bankruptcy predictions in various business environments.
Altman combined the use of ratio analysis and statistical analysis in his seminal
work in bankruptcy prediction. Discriminant analysis was used to classify corporations
based upon certain key financial ratios and whether bankruptcy proceedings had been filed.
Sixty-six firms were selected with half in each of the two categories. Using this
sample, Altman (1968, 599) determined that 95 percent of the sample could be properly

17SAS 59 (AICPA 1989) requires auditors to evaluate the viability status of their clients as part
of every audit examination and provides guidance to the auditor on steps to be followed in making such
decisions.
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classified. He further concluded that by using another sample accurate predictions could
be made with confidence two years in advance o f actual bankruptcy.
Meyer and Pifer (1970,854-5) extended Altman's use o f ratio analysis and statistics
into the banking arena. Their contention was that four factors explain bank failure:
(I) local economic conditions, (2) general economic conditions, (3) quality o f
management, and (4) honesty o f employees. Meyer and Pifer used 10 financial ratios to
proxy these factors for the period between 1948 and 1965 for a matched pair sample o f
30 closed banks and 30 open banks. Their findings indicated that financial positions can
be accurately evaluated for a lead time o f one or two years (867).
Sinkey (1975, 21) continued Altman's research by analyzing the characteristics o f
problem banks. In this study, he used discriminant analysis to classify banks into two
groups: problem banks that have violated a law or regulation or have engaged in unsafe
or unsound banking practices and non-problem banks.

His findings indicated that

"measures o f banking factors such as asset composition, loan characteristics, capital
adequacy, sources and uses o f revenue, efficiency, and profitability are good discriminators
between groups."
Previous studies have used annual data in the prediction of bankruptcy. Baldwin
and Glezen (1992, 289) argued that quarterly data might be more reliable and useful in
predictive models. Twenty-four financial ratios were used as classifying variables in a
discriminate analysis of 40 bankrupt and 40 nonbankrupt firms for a period from 1977 to
1983. Their findings indicated that the use of quarterly data allowed predictions o f
bankruptcy up to nine months earlier than an annual model with no loss o f accuracy.
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Siems (1992) used a linear programming technique known as data envelopment
analysis (DEA) to quantify the role of management. This research was the first known
model to incorporate the use ofDEA in the banking industry. In effect, Siems transformed
the finance theory of the capital assets pricing model (CAPM) to project an "efficient
frontier" for banks. Siems found that less efficient banks were more inclined to fail. He
concluded that this methodology could be used to predict bank failures (38).
In summary, the Baldwin and Glezen (1992) study contributed the concept to the
current topic o f quarterly data for bankruptcy prediction. Other studies either used an
unusual methodology or similar variables to previously studied loan loss research.
Sinkey’s (1975) findings lend credence to the use o f asset composition, loan
characteristics, capital adequacy, sources and uses o f revenue, efficiency, and profitability
as theoretical constructs for variable development. Meyer and Pifer’s (1970) development
of local economic conditions and quality of management led to the use o f these variables
in the current study.
Bankruptcy prediction research has been limited to ex post research. This usage
severely restricts the validity of the findings. In addition, most researchers have not used
theory to test for variable significance before using the variables to predict bankruptcy.
This approach has led to many inconsistences as a result.
Since loans are the largest assets that banks own, a high default rate of these loans
is the main reason most banks become insolvent. The following area addresses the
economy o f scale issue that was raised in the Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey (1987)
study and its relationship to the size effect on loan losses.
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Economy o f Scale
A significant number of researchers have investigated the banking industry to
determine the existence o f an economy of scale. The results have been inconsistent at best.
Reed, Cotter, Gill and Smith (1976, 39) indicated that "although much o f the early
research on bank markets concluded or at least implied that the economies of scale were
not substantial in banking, more current studies have assigned greater value to bank size."
Several studies have exhibited similar results as to the existence o f economies o f scale in
banking, but have differed as to the determination of the bank size where these scales exist
Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey (1987, 515) found modest economies o f scale existing
in relatively small banks. In contrast, Clark and Speaker (1994,23) found that economies
of scale existed in banks with up to $1 billion in total assets. These inconsistencies
suggested that economy o f scale be examined in this study.
As tax law changes, banks are forced to comply with regulation from two areas:
Internal Revenue Regulations and Office o f the Controller regulations. Conflicts between
the two areas have often caused problems.

The next area will focus on research

concerning the tax aspects of loan loss recognition.

Implications o f 86 TRA for Loan
Loss Recognition
Before passage o f the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (86 TRA), Hipshman (1987, 90)
related that all banks were allowed to choose one o f two methods for determining the loan
loss deduction for tax purposes. One allowable method used a chosen percentage o f total
loans to be written off as uncollectible. The other method was an aging method for loans.
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An experience factor determined the percentage o f bad loans to be written off in each
category.
Both methods provided an opportunity for banks to smooth income and thereby
delaying or avoiding their tax liability. Goldman (1987, 365) reported that the main
concern that triggered the 86 TRA reform was the ability o f taxpayers (banks) to deduct
losses prior to their occurrence.
With the passage of the 86 TRA, banks with more than $500 million in total assets
(large banks) could no longer use the reserve method o f accounting for loan losses. Ator
and Claytor (1987, 104) reported that large banks had to recapture their loan loss reserve
against income over a four-year period or write down the closing balance against losses
on outstanding loans as they occurred.
Weld (1991) hypothesized that bank foreclosure behavior would be changed by the
passage of the 86 TRA. To test these hypotheses, he regressed net loans charged off
against the type of bank, state located, size of bank (large or small), demand deposits,
return on assets, net interest spread, securities gains or losses, and annual regional retail
sales.
Weld (1991,26) found that the regulation variable and the economic variable were
so highly correlated as to make the economic variable expendable. Only return on assets
and the state variable for Louisiana were significant, even though the model explained 56
percent of the variation in loan losses.
Weld used Chow tests on the 167 banks that comprised the sample to determine
whether small banks and large banks changed their behavior because o f 86 TRA. He failed
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to reject the hypothesis o f no difference in behavior for either large or small banks due to
the passage o f the 86 TRA (30).
Originally, the 86 TRA required large banks to use the specific write-off method
which allowed a tax deduction for a bad debt only in the year the loss occurred. A
controversial aspect o f this recognition was that regulators allowed banks to recognize the
loss if examiners ordered or would have ordered the write-off. Congress recognized the
dilemma and modified the 86 TRA with IRC Section 166 which O'Donnell and
Mastrangeli (1992, 17) summarized as "debt charged-off for regulatory purposes is
conclusively presumed to have become worthless for tax purposes the same year." This
change in regulation resolved conflicts between the IRS and the OCC.
To summarize, the 86 TRA has had a major effect upon the way that banks
determine loan losses for tax purposes. Previous methods have been disallowed for large
banks and other banks who belong to large holding companies. This difference in tax
treatment for banks based on size is a major area of interest in the current research.

Loan Classification Methods
The next area o f literature to be explored was that o f loan classification. Banks
and bank examiners typically rank loans based upon the assessed probability o f default.
Wu (1969, 704-5) stated that loan classifications are good predictors of loan write-offs.
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The classifying o f loans by degrees of risk is practiced extensively in banking and
bank literature. In performing this task, bank examiners are following the classification
system recommended by the OCC.1*
Dietrich and Kaplan (1982, 18-19) report that "estimates o f default risk facilitate
the internal evaluation and review of lending operations and help to determine loan loss
reserves for financial reporting." They further state that this classification is performed "by
loan officers, auditors, and bank examiners."
In an attempt to address the limitations of Bentson's study, Marlin (1968) is
reported by Benston and Marlin (1974, 36) to have replicated this study by using a
stratified sample of banks o f all sizes, types, and geographical locations for a four-year
period (1963-1966). The most significant finding o f this study was the negative
relationship between substandard loan ratio (SLR) and bank size. Three explanations were
formulated for this finding. The first noted that small banks loaned a greater percentage
of their assets to small borrowers who generally are riskier clients. Another explanation
is that small banks are unable to diversify their investment portfolio geographically and are
thus at more risk from local economic conditions. The third explanation given concerned
the cutoff level in the examination process.
Wojnilower (1962,37) performed a descriptive study into the quality ofbank loans
using a sample consisting o f 60 state member banks of all sizes from New York,
Philadelphia, and Atlanta for a 10-year span between 1947-1957. He concluded that there

'*The Comptroller's Handbook of Examination Procedure (1978) lists 3 "classified" loan
categories: Substandard, Doubtful, and Loss.
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are varying degrees of risk associated with bank lending depending upon industry
differences and size. In addition, he credited changes in the economy for much o f the loan
loss by stating:
Even if all o f a bank's customers have superior credit ratings now, that bank may still
be incurring above-normal risks if these borrowers happen to be concentrated in
lines o f business that are particularly vulnerable to cyclical adversity.
In summary, loan classification methods have been used to allow managers to
quantify default risk by grouping similar loans. Many researchers in the classification area
have contributed variables of interest to the current topic o f study. Dietrich and Kaplan
(1982) stated that bank officers, auditors and examiners function to establish loan
classifications. Marlin’s (1968) finding on size reinforced the size effect under study. He
also found that local economic conditions were significant. Wojnilower (1962) found a
relationship between size and risk in banks.
The next area to be examined is governmental regulation o f allowance for loan
losses. Regulatory accounting practices (RAP) established by the Comptroller of the
Currency and the FDIC are binding on national banks. These practices differ in the
recognition of loan losses from those established for tax purposes. This area will explore
this difference and its implications on loan loss determination.

Governmental Regulation of ALL
Conway and Siegenthaler (1987, 5) reported that use o f loan loss reserves began
with the passage o f the Revenue Act of 1921. This law was written to allow bad debt
expense to become a deduction to income after the passage o f the Sixteenth Amendment
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to the Constitution in 1913. The 1921 Act allowed banks to deduct bad debt expenses
above actual losses for tax purposes. The excess expense was added to a reserve account
to cushion future bank operations against excessive losses. Due to inadequate Internal
Revenue guidelines about the definition o f "reasonableness" (a concept that capped the
reserve for loan losses), most banks continued to use the simpler direct charge-off method.
Conway and Siegenthaler (1987, 5-6) also stated that tax incentives were given to
banks to establish reserves in 1947 and 1954. The Treasury Department established
guidelines to help determine the proper amount to recognize as loss for tax purposes.
Banks were allowed to recognize three times their loss experience over a 20-year period
since 1927.
Banks were not required by generally accepted accounting principles to deduct
loan losses from operating income during this period. Only after passage of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 were banks required to flow loan losses through the reserve account
and be included in the operating statement. Minimums were also set for additions to the
reserve account.
The 86 TRA changed the manner in which large banks and LHC banks with more
than $500 Million in total assets were required to recognize loan losses. Previous
deductions were now required to be recaptured.
In addition, new loan losses could be charged off to loss only as they occurred.
This method was modified with the passage o f IRC 166 which allowed banks to deduct
for tax purposes any loans which regulators had ordered charged off for regulatory
purposes.
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On May 31, 1985, the OCC issued Banking Circular 201 (1985, 1) which
addresses the Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses. As part o f this circular, the OCC
directed that "The ALL must be maintained at a level sufficient to absorb the loss inherent
in the loan portfolio."
In 1992, the OCC modified Banking Circular 201 (1992.4) by stating that only the
"unconfirmed losses that may arise from events that have not yet occurred" be reflected
by the chosen methodology. In addition, the suggestion was made that banks should
"review and adjust historical loss rates for the above factors on a pool-by-pool basis.”
RAP has traditionally determined loan losses.

Lately, GAAP has become

increasingly important in bank accounting. The final section addresses GAAP for loan loss
recognition in banking.

GAAP Recognition of ALL
The AICPA has also been engaged in policy formation for loan loss determination.
The Banking Committee of the AICPA (1968,1983,1992) has written procedural manuals
for auditors engaged in examining banks. The Committee stated that "for purposes o f
expressing an opinion on the financial statements, the CPA must be concerned with the
amount at which loans are stated in the aggregate" (65). In addition, they stated:
The audit procedures should be designed to determine the overall collectibility o f the
entire portfolio and should be performed primarily on a test basis . . . the CPA
should consider the composition o f the loan portfolio, growth trends being
experienced, unspecific loan classifications, previous loss and recovery experience,
management's procedures for loan review and classification, and subjective factors,
such as economic and environmental conditions (63).
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The AICPA Banking Committee (1986) has also issued an audit procedure study
for credit losses o f banks. In this study, the Committee stated:
Management's considerations should include such factors as changes in the nature
and volume o f the portfolio, overall portfolio quality, loan concentrations, trends in
the level o f delinquent and classified loans, specific problem loans, and current and
anticipated economic conditions that may affect the borrower’s ability to pay (13).
The Committee further stated that in establishing the scope of the work to be performed,
the CPA normally (emphasis mine) considers the following factors:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)

Composition of the loan portfolio;
Identified potential problem loans, including loans classified by bank
regulatory agencies;
Trends in loan volume by major categories, especially categories experiencing
rapid growth, and in delinquencies, nonaccrual, and restructured loans;
Previous loss and recovery experience, including timeliness o f charge-offs;
Concentrations of loans to individuals and their related interests, industries,
and geographic regions;
Size o f individual credit exposures (few, large loans versus numerous, small
loans);
Degree of reliance placed on internal loan review and internal audit functions;
T otal amount of loans and problem loans, including delinquent and nonaccrual
loans, by officer;
Lending, charge-off, collection, and recovery policies and procedures;
Local, national, and international economic and environmental conditions;
Experience, competence, and depth o f lending management and staff;
Results of regulatory examinations; and
Related party lending (29).

In summary, RAP and tax regulations were effectively reconciled with the passage
o f IRC 166 which stated that losses recognized due to regulatory examination were
determined to be recognized for tax purposes as well. In addition, the AICPA concurred
with RAP. In the AICPA audit guide for auditing the ALL, a normative model was
described which was the foundation for the current research. Much o f this model comes

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

40

from prior research in previously discussed areas. This normative model was used as a
template for the model used in the research project being constructed.
This discussion o f governmental policy procedures on loan losses concludes the
literature review. Chapter HI provides a discussion of the procedures performed for the
development o f a model that explains loan losses in National Banks. This model will be
tested using Analysis o f Covariance to determine potential differences in loan losses due
to regulation and size. The variables identified in Chapter II provided the basis for the
development o f this model.
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RESEARCH DESIGN

As stated in Chapter I, one purpose o f this research was to explore the
relationships between the variables suggested by the AICPA and net loan losses. The
normative model constructed by the AICPA implies that all banks are affected universally
by the same set o f variables. If this assumption is incorrect, auditors may improve their
efficiency and effectiveness by examining other variables. Jeffrey, Norris, and Witowski
(1992, 20-21) reported that "when performing a bank audit, the independent audit firm
spends between 25-50 percent o f the audit time on loan evaluation and the estimation o f
the Allowance for Credit Losses." To increase audit efficiency and effectiveness, more
knowledge about how these variables interact in the determination o f loan losses would
be helpful. Auditors could increase efficiency by examining only those variables useful in
explaining loan losses for the particular size bank or holding company being audited. If
other variables are not being examined that could explain loan losses, auditors might be
losing effectiveness and thereby increasing their liability.
The procedures used by this researcher in the attempt to accomplish these
objectives are explained in this chapter. The following topics will be discussed in the

41
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remainder o f this chapter: Hypotheses, Sources o f Data, Variables Used as Part o f the
Normative Model, and the Empirical Methodology.

Hypotheses
Research questions raised in Chapter I are restated as research hypotheses in the
following section to determine whether differences in loan losses exist due to size and/or
regulation effects.

Need for Additional Guidance
Concerning Size
An initial purpose was to determine if loan loss determination was altered by bank
size in the presence o f the AICPA model. Size has been established to be a significant
modifier of models in both financial and accounting studies.19 In the banking environment,
the capitalization ratio and loan portfolio potential are determined by bank size.
In addition, several studies have suggested that bank size has determined risk
preference because o f regulatory body policy interference, i.e., the "too big to fail"
policy.20 This policy was established by the Comptroller o f the Currency in a speech to
Congress in which he articulated the concept that a select number of large banks (originally
eleven) would not be allowed to fail because of the contagion effects that their failure
would have on the national banking system. Boyd and Gertler (1994, 2) reported that
large banks have been insulated from their loan losses by this action and have taken greater

l9See Boyd & Gertler (1994) for a discussion of size in banking,
"Especially Samolyk (1994), Read, Bartsch, and Raghunandan (1994), andDemsetz and Strahan
(1995).
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risks as a result. The AICPA did not address the issue o f whether bank size should be a
factor in determining loan losses. This issue needed to be addressed because o f the lack
of authoritative guidance.

Size Effect Hypotheses: Within LHC’s.
lHo:

Bank size as part o f the AICPA model does not help differentiate small and
medium LHC member banks as to loan loss determination.

lHa:

Bank size as part o f the AICPA model differentiates small and m edium LHC
member banks as to loan loss determination.

Size Effect Hypotheses: Within SHC’s.
2Ho:

Bank size as part o f the AICPA model does not help differentiate small and
medium SHC member banks as to loan loss determination.

2Ha:

Bank size as part o f the AICPA model differentiates small and medium SHC
member banks as to loan loss determination.

Need for Additional Guidance
Concerning Scale
A second purpose o f this study was to examine whether size in banking creates an
economy of scale. Contradictory results have been obtained from previous research.
Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey (1987, 515) found modest economies o f scale in small
banks. Clark and Speaker (1994,23) reported economies of scale in banks up to a billion
dollars in assets. Jagtiani and Khanthavit (1996, 1285-6) found that after 1990,
diseconomies o f scale existed in large banks.
Divergent research results make further investigation into "economies of scale"
desirable. Research utilizing loan losses may provide some new insights in this area. Since
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no research has been discovered that utilized loan losses as a proxy for economy o f scale,
a need for guidance is perceived.

Scale Hypotheses: Within LHC’s.
3Ho:

Loan losses are the same for small and medium LHC member banks.

3Hal: Loan losses are more in small LHC member banks than in medium LHC member
banks.
3Ha2: Loan losses are less in small LHC member banks than in medium LHC member
banks.

Scale Hypotheses: Within SHC’s.
4Ho:

Loan losses are the same for small and medium SHC member banks.

4H al: Loan losses are more in small SHC member banks than in medium SHC member
banks.
4Ha2: Loan losses are less in small SHC member banks than in medium SHC member
banks.

Need for Additional Guidance
Concerning Regulation
Another purpose of this study was to examine whether loan losses in national
banks could be explained more fully by incorporating an audit requirement in addition to
the AICPA model. Since the audit function examines the timing o f loan loss recognition,
audited banks should have less latitude in determining the recognition period for the loss.
Both the 86 TRA and the 91 FDIC Improvement Act made provisions for audit
requirements based on size and holding company affiliation that affect the way banks
recognize loan losses. Because the Banking Committee did not investigate this area, the
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issue needs examination to determine if modification o f the normative model is required
to include the effect of audit regulation.

Regulation Effect Hypotheses:
Small Banks.
5Ho: Audit regulation as part o f the AICPA model does not help differentiate small LHC
and small SHC member banks.
5Ha:

There is another model which includes regulation requiring an audit that
differentiates loan losses for small LHC member banks from small SHC member
banks.

Regulation Effect Hypotheses:
Medium Banks.
6Ho:

Audit regulation as part of the AICPA model does not help differentiate medium
LHC and medium SHC member banks.

6Ha:

There is another model which includes regulation requiring an audit that
differentiates loan losses for medium LHC member banks from medium SHC
member banks.

Need for Additional Guidance Concerning
Interaction o f Regulation and Size
When using a dual factor analysis o f variance (of which ANCOVA is an extension),
the first item to test is the interaction o f the two factors. Hatcher and Stepanski (1994,
249) reported that in nonexperimental research "an interaction is a condition in which the
relationship between one predictor variable and the criterion is different at different levels
o f the second predictor variable." As a result, if an interaction is present in single factor
models, only simple effects can be tested.
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Interaction Hypotheses:
Small LHC and Medium
SHC Banks.
7Ho:

Audit regulation and size do not interact as part of the AICPA model to
differentiate small LHC and medium SHC member banks.

7Ha:

There is another model which includes bank size and regulation requiring an audit
that differentiates loan losses in small LHC and medium SHC member banks.

Interaction Hypotheses:
Small SHC and Medium
LHC Banks.
8Ho:

Audit regulation and size do not interact as part o f the AICPA model to
differentiate small SHC and medium LHC member banks.

8Ha:

There is another model which includes bank size and regulation requiring an audit
that differentiates loan losses in medium LHC and small SHC member banks.

Sources o f Data
The data were collected from five sources. Population selection was made by
compiling the bank holding companies listed by both Moody's Bank and Finance Journal
and Compact Disclosure database. Further analysis was performed using these two
sources to determine the banks held by these holding companies. Refinement o f the
population was made by referencing both the SheshunofFs Bank Quarterly: Ratines &
Analysis Journal and Polk's Bank Directory. Financial data for the variables o f the selected
sample o f banks were derived from the SheshunofFs Bank Quarterly: Ratings & Analysis
Journal (1990-1994) and from LABSTAT. the Bureau o f Labor Statistics database. The
following portion o f this paper will discuss additional procedures for selecting population,
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sample, and variables, as well as the empirical and statistical methods employed in the
analysis of the data.

Population Selection
National charter commercial banks o f both small and medium size banks were
chosen as the population of interest. National banks are the most heavily regulated type
o f institution, being supervised by the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the
Federal Reserve, as well as the FDIC. National charter banks usually have annual
examinations by OCC examiners.
A bank examination consists o f assuring that banks are in compliance with
regulations imposed by the regulatory agency (i.e., Federal Reserve, OCC, state banking
boards, etc.) as well as the FDIC, the bank's insurance agent. Customarily, the Federal
Reserve and FDIC depend upon the OCC examination and therefore rarely examine
national banks.
When a problem bank is recognized, the FDIC can intervene to issue cease and
desist orders, change managers, or close the bank. With such close scrutiny of national
banks, the probability of income smoothing by manipulating the ALL is diminished. In
addition, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991,653) reported that firms with audit committees are
less likely to manipulate earnings, a form o f income smoothing.
Lapidus (1980, 2) stated that in contrast to national banks, state Federal Reserve
member banks are subject to examination by both state bank examiners, as well as annual
examinations by the Federal Reserve. Conversely, state chartered nonmember banks are
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examined by the FDIC and state examiners. Since each agency has different capital
requirements and loan write off determinations, there is a difference between state and
national banks that could confound the study. Therefore, state banks were not included
in the population.
The population o f national banks was then subdivided into two areas to be studied:
those belonging to LHCs and those belonging to SHCs. Banks affiliated with the LHCs
and SHCs were identified by accessing Compact Disclosure. During the search process,
these banks were fUrther defined as being either small or medium. Large banks were not
included in the study because of the differences in lending practices. One of these
practices is the lending o f large sums to foreign countries. Since this type o f loan carries
with it a high default rate, inclusion of this size of institution might have introduced bias
into the study. Missing observations from Compact Disclosure were identified using
Moody's Bank and Finance Manual, as well as Polk's Bank Directory.

Sample Data
Two hundred and thirty-six banks were randomly selected from LHC’s and SHC’s.
These banks were further divided by size into medium and small banks. The sample data
for the selected banks were taken from two sources. Quarterly financial data were
selected from SheshunofFs The Bank Quarterly Ratines. Economic data was downloaded
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics database: LABSTAT.
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Variables for Selected Banks
Variables used to test all listed hypotheses were collected for the two classes of
national banks: LHC member and SHC member. In addition, these two classes o f holding
companies were further divided into two partitions in each class: small and medium bank
size. Small banks were defined as having less than $100 million in total assets over the
three-year period o f study. Medium banks were defined as having at least $100 million,
but no more than $500 million in total assets during the study period. This research area
has had incongruent results previously because researchers have not defined a consistent
standard size for small, medium, and large banks.

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable Net Charge-Offs (NCO) was the actual loan losses incurred
by the selected banks. These loan losses were measured as the quarterly charge-offs minus
any recoveries. In addition, the losses were reported as a percentage of average loans to
eliminate the size effect.
Moore (1992, 42) chose not to use actual loan losses in his study. His reasoning
was that some banks write off problem loans immediately while others carry them as
nonperforming.

To correct for this, he added the total loan write-offs to the total

nonperforming loans, subtracted the recoveries, and divided the results by total loans.
Since all nonperforming loans are required by examiners to be expensed eventually, NCO
was determined to be a more appropriate dependent variable than the one used by Moore.

«
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Independent Variables Suggested
bv the AICPA
The first factor suggested by the AICPA Banking Committee was the Composition
o f the Loan Portfolio. This factor is actually a measure o f the non-systemic risk that a
bank accepts when investing in monetary lending. Copeland and Weston (1988, 198)
defined non-systemic risk as a measure o f covariance between returns on the investment
and the market portfolio. Fama (1976), Sharpe (1964), and other financial theorists
contended that financial analysts reduce non-systemic risk by diversifying the loan
portfolio. Since market changes affect different businesses in various ways, bankers
diversify their loan portfolio by lending across a wide spectrum of business types, so that
market changes will have less effect on loan losses. Lyons (1994, 36) reported that:
By increasing the number of borrowers in a loan portfolio, management reduces the
importance of any single borrower to the loan portfolio and therefore, the potential
impact of loan loss from a single borrower on that portfolio.
The loan portfolio factor was measured by four levels represented by the principal
loan types made by banks. To control for size, each o f the variables was divided by total
assets. The four levels o f loans were (1) construction loans, (2) commercial real estate,
(3) consumer loans, and (4) agricultural loans.
In addition, this factor also measured the concentration ofloans to related interests,
industries and geographic areas, since banks largely loan within their customers' area
(disregarding participating loans). The principal purpose of this factor was to capture the
quality of the loan portfolio diversification for each bank.
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The second factor studied is Trends in Loan Volume and in Delinquencies. This
factor is a trend variable that measures the changes in loan concentration and the effect o f
the changes on loan losses from period to period. In effect, this factor is the constant
change in portfolio mix that Foster (1986, 312) suggested should occur due to different
risk assessments (changes in beta)21 which occur in the market over time.
This factor was measured by four variables which reflected the changes in loan
concentration in each o f the four principal loan categories and one variable that reflected
changes in delinquencies. Each loan concentration variable was quantified as being the
percentage change in loans in that category controlled for size by dividing by the change
in total assets. The four loan concentration levels were (1) change in construction loans,
(2) change in commercial real estate, (3) change in consumer loans, and (4) change in
agricultural loans. The delinquency component was measured by the change in nonaccrual
loans as a percentage of gross loans.
The third factor addressed was a composite o f Potential Problem Loans and
Results o f Regulatory Examination, two areas the AICPA suggests as being normally
audited. Potential Problem Loans are defined by Sheshunoff (1994, 2-6) as a measure o f
asset quality which reflects "a bank's ability to make and collect loans. Nonaccrual loans
are a Result of Regulatory Examination. Examinations may result in potentially bad loans
being classified as "substandard," "doubtful," or "loss." Loss classifications result in direct
charge-offs, while "doubtful" may result in a nonaccrual classification.

2lBeta is a finance term which measures the risk of individual assets of a portfolio to the entire
market
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This classification factor was measured by nonaccrual loans. This factor was
quantified as nonaccrual loans and leases and was controlled for size by dividing by the
gross loans.
The next factor included in the AICPA model is Economic Conditions. Graham
and Homer (1988, 10) found that "an adverse economy was a significant factor in 35
percent of the (bank) failures." This factor should be a three level factor due to national,
international, and local economic effects on loan losses. National effects should be
measured by the loan concentration variables and thus would be redundant to the study in
the aggregate.

In other words, the national economic effect will be eliminated by

randomization. International economic effects occur mainly in large banks that lend on the
international markets. Large banks were eliminated from the study because o f the
confounding effect that these foreign loans might have upon the study.
The local economic effect was the only factor that was addressed. Ford (1994,25)
reported that "changes in annual failure rates reflect variations in general economic
conditions and correlated closely with changes in other measures of economic health such
as the unemployment rate and gross domestic product." In addition, Hooks (1992, 1-2)
found that employment in Texas and Louisiana mirrored bank profitability during the
1980s.
This factor level was measured by the local county unemployment rate. The data
were obtained from the National Bureau ofLabor Statistics (NBLS) database, LABSTAT.
The NBLS began the collection of County level unemployment data in 1990.
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The fifth factor studied was the Experience, Competence & Depth ofManagement.
As loan officers become more experienced and more competent in their evaluation o f loan
applications, the number of "bad" loans made should decrease with a corresponding
decrease in loan losses. Graham and Homer (1988, 8) in a study sponsored by the OCC
found th at" ... the policies and procedures of a bank's management and board o f directors
have the greater influence on whether a bank will succeed or not."
Spadaford (1988, 21-22) identified poor asset management as one o f the causal
factors leading to bank failure. Boffey and Robson (1995, 66) further expounded on this
idea by stating:
A key reason why the correct management of credit risk is so important is because
banks have such a limited capacity to absorb loan losses . . . The low risk-low
marginnature of banking business is something that has been written about for some
time.
This single level factor was measured by the President's weighting, an indirect
management measure suggested by SheshunofFs rating analysis. Sheshunoff (1994, n.3)
calculated the scores for this measure by using weights obtained from a survey o f bank
presidents. The presidents were asked to estimate the percentage weight o f importance
for each of the CAMEL22 areas. The weights for all areas except management were then
multiplied by four which yielded a weighted base. These bases were then standardized by
rank and their total rank scores summed to yield a weighted total score. Comparison of
this weighted total score versus a percentile curve determined the final weights. The scale
o f this variable was from 0 to 99, with 99 being considered the best.

“ CAMEL is an acronym which represents (1)Capital adequacy, (2)Asset quality, (3)Management,
(4)Eamings, and (5)Liquidity. CAMEL ratings are a common bank rating measure.
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A similar variable suggested by the AICPA indicates the need to study Loan Losses
as a Function o f the Loans made by each Individual Loan Officer. While this variable
might be appropriate for an individual bank in determining effectiveness o f loan officers,
implementation in an aggregate model would be difficult because o f the inability to collect
proprietary data.
Another variable examined was that o f Previous Loss and Recovery Experience.
The AICPA Committee on Banking (1992, 63-4) suggests that past losses are indicative
o f the risk preference o f the lending institutions. In addition, recoveries illustrate how well
loan officers recognize and remedy problem loans. This variable was measured by lagging
the net loan loss by one period.
Four additional variables suggested by the AICPA Banking Committee (1992,645) as being pertinent to the ALL audit, but not included in the study, were (1) Size of
Individual Credit Exposures, (2) Related Party Transactions, (3) Degree of Reliance
placed on Internal Loan Review and Internal Audit Functions, and (4) Lending, Chargeoff, Collection, and Recovery Policies and Procedures. All four variables are easily seen
to be bank specific and thus are not useful for an aggregate decision. These four variables
were not included in the model because of this limitation.

Independent Variables Suggested bv
Other Research
Two variables suggested by the Auditing Principles Board as being important to
internal controls structures are size and regulation. Neither was examined by the AICPA
Banking Committee.

In addition, econometric modeling often inadvertently omits
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variables. To test for this, a trend variable is included to absorb the random error of
omitted variables. These variables are introduced in the following sections.

Regulation. The banking industry has been considered one of the most heavily
regulated in the United States. While this situation was attenuated partially by the bank
reform acts passed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the industry continues to have
enormous regulatory supervision. One aspect o f this regulation pertinent to this research
is the requirement by the OCC that national banks over $500 million in assets or whose
holding company has more than $500 million in assets submit to an annual external audit
each year.
In earlier research, Amos (1992,810) found that regulatory changes did not cause
bank closings during the 1980s, but suggested that data for later years might need to be
examined. Hollingsworth and Rose (1995,27) extended the research of regulation effect
in banking and determined that the 86 TRA was linked to changes in bank asset quality
during the late 1980s.
This research extends the study of regulation by an examination o f the effects o f
OCC rulings and 86 TRA enactments on loan losses o f LHC member banks. These banks
were hypothesized to have been affected by the rulings and regulation which requires these
banks to submit to an annual external audit. The SHC member banks were hypothesized
not to be impacted since they were not required to be audited. Large banks o f more than
$500 million in assets were specifically excluded from the study due to the confounding
differences in operations between small and medium banks and those o f large banks.
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Size. Another area of interest in banking is the impact of size on bank efficiency.
Do banks become more efficient as they grow larger? The existence o f an economy of
scale in banking has continued to elude researchers. Samolyk (1994,2) reported that "the
phenomenon o f bank holding companies emerged in the 1950s and 1960s as a response
to restrictions on the scale and scope of banking activities."
Boyd and Gertler (1994) hypothesized that large banks were responsible for the
poor performance of the industry during the 1980s. They attributed this to two factors:
"deregulation and financial innovation led to increased overall competition for the banking
industry" and "the existing regulatory environment tended to subsidize risk-taking by large
banks more than that by small banks" (2). They concluded that even "after regional
conditions are controlled for, size still matters in explaining loan losses" (3). In addition,
they contend that "generally speaking, smaller banks adopt more conservative asset and
liability positions than do large banks" (8). They advanced the scale controversy by
concluding that the smallest banks (under $50 million in assets) performed poorly because
of an inability to utilize scale economies (21).
Samolyk (1994, 3) reported that "differences in banking conditions also appear to
be associated with bank size and holding company affiliation." In contrast to Boyd and
Gertler, she found that "relatively small banks ($100 million to $500 million in assets, 1987
dollars) seem to have turned in the best performance in terms of profitability and asset
quality" (14).
Demsetz and Strahan (1995,23) validate Samolyk's findings in an indirect manner.
In their study based on small and large holding companies, they found that after 1991 an
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inverse relationship between size and risk began to be statistically significant in holding
company banks. They concluded that "changes in the regulatory climate could explain
changes in the relationship between size and risk." This relationship explains Samolyk's
(1994, 16) finding that smaller banks outperformed larger banks in this period due to the
existence o f a direct relationship between risk and return.

Trend. In any econometric model, the omission o f a relevant variable causes biased
estimates of the coefficients which precludes the use o f standard tests o f significance. If
this omitted variable exhibits trends over time, Johnson, Johnson, and Buse (1987, 357)
state that the preferred methodology is to introduce a trend variable which "picks up the
effect of these omitted variables and thereby reduces the potential bias in the coefficients
of the other variables included in the equation." They elaborate by stating the trend
variable "detrends" the data such that "the coefficients o f the other variables in the
equation will be explaining not changes in the level of the dependent variable, but instead
explaining deviations of the dependent variable from its trend value."
To incorporate the methodology of Johnson, Johnson, and Buse (1987, 357), the
model was expanded to include a trend variable. This variable was defined to reflect the
quarter and year in which the data originated. A statistically significant trend variable will
reduce bias, but may indicate that an important relevant variable has been omitted from the
data set.
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Empirical Methodology
This section describes the statistical procedures used to analyze the hypotheses
elaborated in the first section of this chapter. Statistical procedures were performed using
SAS/STAT.23

The Analysis o f Covariance Model
Y = p + a + P + D a p t + SP(X-x) + €
Y

NET CHARGE-OFFS RECOGNIZED

P

GRAND MEAN

a

=

TWO LEVEL FACTOR REPRESENTING BANK SIZE, SMALL AND MEDIUM
TWO LEVEL FACTOR REPRESENTING HOLDING COMPANY AFFILIATION

P
D ap,

=

INTERACTION OF SIZE AND HOLDING COMPANY AFFILIATION

6

=

RANDOM ERROR

Analysis o f Covariance
The statistical method chosen to analyze the research area was analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA). Puri and Sen (1969) and Quade (1967) reported that ANCOVA
functioned by measuring the effect o f a class or classes of variables on the dependent
variable in conjunction with a number o f covariates. Wildt and Ahtola (1978, 9) stated in
the regression perspective case where the covariates and categorical independent variables
are of equal interest "the researcher may wish to examine the effect or contribution o f each
independent variable (both quantitative and qualitative), after adjusting or correcting for

“ SAS/STAT is a registered trademark for statistical software marketed by SAS Institute Inc.
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the effects of all other independent variables.” Since the research question at hand asked
how bank size and/or regulation affected loan losses as part o f an existing model,
ANCOVA appeared to be the most appropriate tool for this task.24
Wildt and Ahtola (1978, 7-9) stated that among its uses is that of performing a
type of regression analysis which controls for categorical variables when examining the
relationship between two or more quantitative variables.

Tests o f ANCOVA Assumptions.

When performing exploratory research,

assumptions made about a population distribution may prove to be erroneous and thus
cause a selected methodology to be inappropriate for a preselected statistical test. Winer,
Brown and Michels (1991, 764-5) stated that the assumptions required for ANCOVA to
produce reliable results are (1) normal distribution of the error term, (2) independent
distribution of the error term (homoscadasticity), and (3) homogeneity o f the within-class
regression coefficients. The following sections will discuss the tests which determine the
validity of these assumptions.

Test of Normality. Normality of distribution must be examined to determine the
appropriate statistical procedure to use for hypothesis testing. A Kolmogorov-Smimov
(K-S) test on the data was conducted to explore the distribution o f the data. The K-S
statistic, an output o f the SAS Univariate procedure, is a common measure o f univariate
normality. The null hypothesis for a normal distribution must be rejected if the p value for

24ANCOVA is a statistical tool used to examine relationships between at least two quantitative
variables and at least one qualitative variable.
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this statistic is less than .05. The p value for the K-S test on the data was .01, which
indicated a nonnormally distributed sample.

Ranked Transformations. Nonnormally distributed data can lead to incorrect
conclusions in inferential statistical analyses and may bias the correlation coefficients.
Conover (1980, 337) suggested the use o f rank transformation as one way to correct for
this defect. To perform this operation, he suggested ranking all the observations from
smallest to largest and then applying the usual analysis of variance to the ranks. Conover
and Iman (1981, 124) further contended that this procedure29 yields a distribution free
procedure that "results in a class o f nonparametric methods that includes the WilcoxonMann-Whitney test, the Kruskal-Wallis test, the Wilcoxon signed ranks test, the Friedman
test, Spearman's rho, and others."
Conover (1980, 337) suggested that the use of rank transformations could
mitigate the damage caused by the nonnormality. He stated that "in experimental designs
for which no nonparametric test exists. . . to use the usual analysis o f variance on the data
and then to use the same procedure on the rank transformed data." He further contended
that "when the two procedures give substantially different results, the analysis on ranks is
probably more accurate than the analysis on the data and should be preferred.”

"The SAS/STAT User's Guide (1989, 27) concurred with this approach stating that "most
nonparametric methods are based on taking the ranks and analyzing these ranks (or transformations of
them) instead of the original values."
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Comparisons o f the two procedures yielded a relatively large difference between
the ranked and unranked data with several variables changing significance.26 (See
Appendices II and III.) Therefore, the rank transformation o f the data was considered
preferable. Conover (1980, 337) stated that it yields:
A procedure that is only conditionally distribution free. . . it is robust, which means
that the true level o f significance is usually fairly close to the approximate level o f
significance used in the test, no matter what the underlying population distribution
might be.

Test for Homoscedasticitv. The second assumption usually required for ANCOVA
is independent distribution o f the error term (homoscedasticity). A test for this condition
was performed using Proc Reg with the Spec option. Results o f this test indicated that the
sample had heteroscedastic tendencies.

Test for Homogeneity of Internal Repressions. The third assumption commonly
attributed to ANCOVA is homogeneity of internal regressions, which requires the
regression coefficients to be constant between the different classes. Winer, Brown, and
Michels (1991, 765) related that:
With regard to the homogeneity of the within-class regression coefficients, if
assignment o f units to treatments is random and the treatments do not affect the
covariate, one expects that assumption to be met. If intact groups are assigned to
the treatments, there may possibly be heterogenetity o f internal regression.

“In following Conover’s method, the data were ranked smallest to largest using SAS Proc Rank.
This procedure was followed by ANCOVA, as utilized by SAS Proc GLM.
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In the present study, the treatments were the class variables of size and regulation. Since
the effect of treatments on covariates could not be ruled out, the assumption of
homogeneity o f internal regressions could not be met.
Littell, Freund, and Spector (1991, 243) stated that a lack o f homogeneity
"reflect[s] an interaction between the treatment groups and the independent variables or
covariates." This interaction causes the intersection of the internal regression lines. The
effect of this intersection results in the decomposition of the ANCOVA model.
Several methods have been utilized by different researchers to examine this
interaction effect. The methodology selected to test for the presence o f heterogeneity
followed the suggestion o f Littell, Freund, and Spector (1991) to regress loan losses on
interactions of covariate and class variables as additions to the regression equation. If
these interaction terms are determined to be statistically significant, then the slopes o f the
internal regression lines for the class variable and the covariate have different values which
cause the lines to intersect.
The data were tested for homogeneity of internal regressions by constructing
interaction terms for all potential class-covariate combinations. These combinations were
then inserted into the regression of loan losses on the bank size, regulation, and the 14
covariate variables. The results o f that investigation are illustrated in Table I for regulation
effects and in Table II for bank size effects.
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TABLE I
REGULATION AND COVARIATE INTERACTION
Param eter
Regulation*Construction Loans
Regulation*Real Estate Loans
Regulation*Consumer Loans
Regulation*Agriculture Loans
Regulation*Previous Loss Experience
Regulation*Problem Loans
Regulation*Economic Conditions
Regulation*Management Quality
Regulation*Trend Variable
Regulation*Changes in:
Construction Loans
Real Estate Loans
Delinquent Loans
Agriculture Loans
Consumer Loans

F value

PR> F

1.18
0.44
1.07
11.20
10.41
0.07
0.55
8.57
0.73

0.2764
0.5093
0.3007
0.0008
0.0013
0.7896
0.4597
0.0034
0.3921

4.48
1.52
1.40
0.83
2.71

0.0343
0.2177
0.2375
0.3632
0.0999
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TABLEn
BANK SIZE AND COVARIATE INTERACTION
Param eter
Bank Size*Construction Loans
Bank Size*Real Estate Loans
Bank Size*Consumer Loans
Bank Size* Agriculture Loans
Bank Size*Previous Loss Experience
Bank Size*Problem Loans
Bank Size*Economic Conditions
Bank Size*Management Quality
Bank Size*Trend Variable
Bank Size*Changes in:
Construction Loans
Real Estate Loans
Delinquent Loans
Agriculture Loans
Consumer Loans

F Value

PR> F

0.23
0.31
1.57
2.51
1.60
0.14
0.09
1.45
0.00

0.6345
0.5791
0.2096
0.1133
0.2060
0.7107
0.7640
0.2290
0.9840

1.58
0.00
0.24
0.39
0.14

0.2085
0.9894
0.6244
0.5313
0.7062

An examination of Table I reveals four variables that indicate a statistical
relationship with regulation.

The first variable that illustrates significance is the

intersection of regulation and agriculture loans. Moore (1992) reported that agricultural
loans helped explain loan losses in small banks. During the period o f his study, he reported
"agricultural stress was at its worst in 1986" (119). The perception is that agricultural
loans were recognized as being impaired by the auditors) and written down accordingly.
The second statistically significant variable is the intersection o f regulation and
previous loss experience. Since auditors decide when banks will write off bad loans, the
perception is that the timing o f the loan write-off is associated with audit regulation.
The third variable of significance is the intersection of regulation and management
quality. A significant part of an audit requires the auditor to evaluate personnel as part of
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the internal control study.

A possible explanation for the relationship between

management quality and regulation might be that audited banks have higher quality
personnel as a result of the audit.
The final significant variable is the intersection o f regulation and changes in
construction loans. During the period o f study, 1991-1993, the US economy was in a deep
recession. New construction loans were not being made and defaults on existing loans
were common.

A possible explanation for this relationship between changes in

construction loans and regulation requiring audits is that the audits forced the recognition
o f the impairment of the construction loan.
Do these four heterogenous variables out o f 28 prevent the usage o f ANCOVA
because of the presence of heterogeneity o f variance? Joyce Lee Shields (1973,29) stated:
Results indicated that ANCOVA is robust to violations o f assumptions of
homoscedasticity and homogeneity o f variance, both singly and in combination,
when group sizes were equal.
Since the study was designed for a two by two block matrix with equal numbers o f banks
in each cell, the perception is that ANCOVA is robust to the slight appearance of
heterogeneity o f variance and heteroscedasticity.
In the next section, the statistical procedures will be introduced. This area will
include the sample selection and time frame for the experiment, as well as sample size
determination.
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Applications o f ANCOVA
ANCOVA has not been applied significantly in accounting research.

Most

applications have been used in marketing and managerial topics. McElroy, Morrow,
Power, and Iqbal (1993,374-7) applied ANCOVA to measuring the effect o f commitment
on insurance agents’ perceptions, attitudes, and performance. Schnake, Cochran, and
Dumler (1995,215-7) used ANCOVA to measure organizational citizenship as a measure
o f job satisfaction. Brill (1994, 218) increased the statistical precision in measuring
managerial opportunism.

Statistical Procedures
ANCOVA was performed upon selected sample banks to test the hypotheses
concerning the determinants o f loan losses in national banks.

To allow multiple

comparisons to be made, both within and between groups, the sample observations were
selected randomly from each 10th percentile o f the population by total asset size.
As the nonparametric procedure is asymptotic and requires large samples (i.e., >30
observations) to have reliable results, 60 observations from each o f the subpopulation
groups were selected randomly. One observation from each group had to be omitted due
to changes in bank holding company affiliation that occurred during the study period.
Previous researchers have used similar size samples.27 This sample size also correlates
with the central limit theorum. Cangelosi, Taylor and Rice (1983, 133-7) cited this

"Examples of sample size of previous research: Dhanani (1986) 22 banks, Altman (1968) 33
firms, Meyer and Pifer (1970) 30 banks, Baldwin and Glezen (1992) 40 firms, Yue (1992) 60 banks,
Espahbodi (1991) 48 banks, and Wojnilower (1962) 60 banks.
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theorum as stating that as a sample size approaches 30 observations, the distribution tends
to become normally distributed.
For each o f the 59 remaining banks from each group, observations were collected
in quarterly increments for the variables discussed in the previous section for a period of
three years between 1991 and 1993. Austin (1992,38) reported that the normal operating
cycle o f a bank (issuance o f loan to collection) is five years. The use of this ideal period
was precluded because o f the growth in bank size that resulted in too many banks
changing size category over this number o f years. Three years was determined to be the
most practical period of time that could be utilized and still illustrate the problem.
Chapter m has presented the methodology used in the empirical analysis of
determinants ofbank loan losses. The variables defined by the AICPA as determining loan
losses were enumerated as were two suggested additions: regulation and bank size.
Hypotheses to be tested were presented. The population was defined as being small and
medium size national banks held by large and small holding companies. Selection o f the
sample and collection o f data were also discussed. Statistical procedures used for testing
the distribution o f the data were delininated. Analysis o f covariance was selected as the
statistical tool to perform hypotheses tests. The results o f these hypotheses tests are
presented in Chapter IV.
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CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

The purpose o f this chapter is to present the results o f the empirical analyses o f the
study on determinants of loan losses in national banks. Results are divided into five major
sections. Section one relates the findings of tests for interactive effects between regulation
and size. Main effects of size and regulation cannot be determined until the presence or
absence of interaction is determined.
The next section discloses the effects o f bank regulation on loan losses, as
measured by the requirement to be audited annually. Section three relates the statistical
relationship of loan losses and bank size, which consists o f small and medium national
banks.
The fourth section consists o f an examination into the economy o f scale
controversy in banking. As a summation, section five illustrates the association o f loan
losses and the covariates suggested by the AICPA Banking Committee.

Need for Additional Guidance Concerning
Regulation and Size
This section presents the results o f tests performed to determine whether loan
losses are affected by bank regulation requiring financial audits and by size as measured

68
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by total assets o f national banks. Do size and regulation interact to affect loan losses in
national banks? No previous research has been found that addressed this question. In
conjunction with guidance for size and regulation main effects, guidance for interaction
between these two areas needs to be addressed as well. The presence or absence o f an
interactive effect (see the Covariance Model on page 58) needs to be determined prior to
testing for main effects.
To determine whether interaction o f size and regulation occurs, 59 small LHC
member banks were contrasted with 59 medium SHC member banks. In addition, 59 small
SHC member banks were contrasted with 59 medium LHC member banks.
ANCOVA was performed on these comparisons to determine whether a
statistically significant relationship existed between loan losses and the interaction o f
regulation and size for these two groups. The results o f this analysis are shown in Table

m.

TABLEm
TEST FO R INTERACTION BETW EEN
SIZE AND REGULATION
Param eter
Bank Size*Regulation

F Value

PR> F

0.27

0.6026

Based upon this statistical analysis, the results fail to reject the null hypothesis o f
no statistical differences between group means.

Therefore, the null hypothesis for

interaction of size and regulation is accepted as follows:
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7Ho:

Audit regulation and size do not interact as part o f the AICPA model to
differentiate small LHC and medium SHC member banks.

8Ho:

Audit regulation and size do not interact as part o f the AICPA model to
differentiate small SHC and medium LHC member banks.

Need for Additional Guidance
Concerning Regulation
One area neglected by the AICPA has been the impact o f regulation on bank
determination o f the ALL. In the current study, loan losses o f national banks were
examined to determine whether the loan loss recognition was affected by the external audit
function, a type o f bank regulation.
Fifty-nine small LHC member banks required by regulation to have annual
independent audits were compared to 59 small SHC member banks that had no such
regulation. The results of that comparison of least square loan losses are shown in Table

TV.
TABLE IV
LOAN LOSSES IN SMALL SIZE BANKS
DUE TO REGULATION

Param eter

LS M eans
Loan Losses

Std. Err.
Loan Losses

Small SHC Member Banks
Small LHC Member Banks

1320.55234
1327.75368

28.88244
28.93058

Fifty-nine medium LHC member banks required by regulation to submit to annual
independent audits were compared to 59 medium SHC member banks that had no such
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regulation. The results of that comparison o f least square loan losses are shown in Table
V.

TABLE V
LOAN LOSSES IN MEDIUM SIZE BANKS
DUE TO REGULATION

Param eter
Medium SHC Member Banks
Medium LHC Member Banks

LS Means
Loan Losses

Std. E rr.
Loan Losses

1491.50110
1527.60185

28.47070
28.36672

ANCOVA was performed on the ranked data to determine whether a statistically
significant relationship existed between loan losses, previously defined in the study as net
charge-offs, and the two classes o f national banks. The results of that analysis are shown
in Table VI.

TABLE VI
PERCEPTION O F A NEED CONCERNING REGULATION
AS PART O F AICPA MODEL
Param eter
Regulation

F Value
0.58

PR> F
0.4458

Tables IV and V indicate differences in least square means between the two classes
o f banks exists. Table VI, however, clearly indicates that these differences are not
statistically significant.
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Based upon this statistical analysis, the results fail to reject the null hypotheses of
no statistical differences between group means. Therefore, the null hypotheses for both
small and medium banks are accepted as follows:
SHo:

Audit regulation as part o f the AICPA model does not help differentiate small LHC
and small SHC member banks.

6Ho:

Audit regulation as part o f the AICPA model does not help differentiate medium
LHC and medium SHC member banks.

Need for Additional Guidance
Concerning Size
An additional area left unexplored by the AICPA is the effect o f bank size on loan
losses. Previous studies have debated the existence o f an economy o f scale in banking.
One purpose o f this research was to determine whether size should be considered when
auditing banks. To achieve that purpose, an "F" test was administered to the data. The
holding company effect was held constant by comparisons within holding company size.
Fifty-nine small LHC member banks were compared to 59 medium LHC member
banks. Results o f the comparison of least square mean loan losses are exhibited in Table

vn.
TABLE VTI
LOAN LOSSES FO R SM ALL & MEDIUM
LHC M EM BER BANKS
Param eter

LS M eans
Loan Losses

Std. E rr.
Loan Losses

Small LHC Member Banks
Medium LHC Member Banks

1327.75368
1527.60185

28.93058
28.36672
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Fifty-nine small SHC member banks also were compared to 59 medium SHC
member banks. Results of the comparison of least square mean loan losses are exhibited
in Table VIII.

TABLE V m
LOAN LOSSES FOR SMALL & MEDIUM
SHC MEMBER BANKS

Param eter

LS Means
Loan Losses

Std. E rr.
Loan Losses

Small SHC Member Banks
Medium SHC Member Banks

1320.55234
1491.50110

28.88244
28.47070

ANCOVA was performed on the ranked data to determine whether a statistically
significant relationship existed between loan losses and the two sizes o f national banks.
The results o f the statistical analysis are shown on Table IX.

TABLE IX
PERCEPTION OF A NEED CONCERNING
SIZE AS PART OF AICPA MODEL
Param eter
Size

F Value

PR > F

37.12

0.0001

Tables VII and VTII indicate differences in group means between the two sizes o f
banks exists. Table IX demonstrates the statistical significance o f this difference.
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As a result of this statistical analysis, the null hypotheses o f no effect must be
rejected. The resulting alternative hypotheses for small and medium banks are accepted
as follows:
lHa:

Bank size as part o f the AICPA model differentiates small and medium LHC
member banks as to loan loss determination.

2Ha:

Bank size as part o f the AICPA model differentiates small and medium SHC
member banks as to loan loss determination.

Need for Additional Guidance
Concerning Scale
The inconsistent results from numerous research projects for determination of
economy o f scale in banking calls for additional guidance for this issue. Does increased
size lead to efficiencies in loan departments that allow them to decrease the bank loan
losses? The advent o f the new information age o f computers suggests that loan officers
should have more and better information on customers. In theory, better lending decisions
should be made that would decrease loan losses and create an economy o f scale.
To determine whether an economy or a diseconomy of scale exists, a two-tailed

T test was performed on the data. Holding company size was held constant to prevent
confounding the decision. The results o f that test for small holding companies may be seen
in Table X.
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TABLEX
ECONOMY OF SCALE HYPOTHESES:
W ITHIN SHC’S

Param eter

LS Means
Loan Losses

Std. E rr.
Loan Losses

Small SHC Member Banks
Medium SHC Member Banks

1320.55234
1491.50110

28.88244
28.47070

Pr >T

.0001

From this test, the null hypothesis (4Ho) must be rejected. In addition, the first
alternative hypothesis (4Hal) o f larger loan losses for small banks must be rejected.
Therefore, the results are a failure to reject hypothesis (4Ha2) that loan losses are smaller
in small SHC banks. The alternative hypothesis is accepted as follows:
4Ha2: Loan losses are less in small SHC member banks than in medium SHC member
banks.

Economy of Scale Hypotheses Within
LHC’S
An examination was also made into LHC banks to determine whether an economy
or diseconomy of scale exists between small and medium banks in the large holding
company environment. The results of that exam are exhibited in Table XI.
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TABLE X I
ECONOMY O F SCALE HYPOTHESES:
W ITH IN LH C ’*
Param eter
Param eter

LS M eans
Loan Losses

Std.Err.
Loan Losses

PR>T

Small LHC Member Banks
Medium LHC Member Banks

1327.75368
1527.60185

28.93058
28.36672

.0001

From this test, both the null hypothesis (3Ho) and the first alternative hypothesis
(3Hal) o f larger loan losses for small banks must be refuted. Therefore, the results are a
failure to reject hypothesis (3Ha2) that loan losses are less in small SHC banks. This
alternative hypothesis is accepted as follows:
3Ha2: Loan losses are less in small LHC member banks than in medium LHC member
banks.

Need for Additional Guidance Concerning
the AICPA Model Variables
The AICPA has advanced a prescriptive model for auditors to follow when
examining the allowance for loan losses o f banks.

Since this model has not been

empirically tested, the statistical significance o f the suggested variables have not been
examined. In the current study, loan losses o f national banks are examined to determine
whether this prescriptive model can aid in differentiating between small and medium
national banks, as well as between those banks required by regulation to be audited and
those that are not.
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Fifty-nine national banks from each o f the four categories were compared to
determine whether size, regulation, and the AICPA variables, used as covariates, could
differentiate loan losses. ANCOVA was performed on the ranked data to determine
whether a statistically significant relationship existed between loan losses and the covariate
variables. The results o f this analysis are shown in Table XII.

TABLE XH
AICPA MODEL USED AS COVARIATES

Param eter

F Value

PR < F

Construction Loans
Real Estate Loans
Consum er Loans
Agricultural Loans
Previous Loss Experience
Problem Loans
Economic Conditions
M anagem ent Q uality
Trend Variable
Changes in:
Construction Loans
Real Estate Loans
Consumer Loans
Agricultural Loans
Delinquent Loans

1.01
0.00
5.38
2.97
5.98
42.82
1.52
54.55
253.71

0.3142
0.9825
0.0204
0.0849
0.0145
0.0001
0.2184
0.0001
0.0001

7.39
0.82
7.29
0.29
24.03

0.0066
0.3652
0.0070
0.5911
0.0001

The results are that o f the 14 covariates used in the model, only eight demonstrate
statistical significance.

O f these, seven were suggested by the AICPA Banking

Committee. Consumer loans, previous loss experience, problem loans, management
quality, and changes in construction loans, consumer loans, and delinquent loans all
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demonstrated statistically significance at the .05 level. In addition, the trend variable also
demonstrated a strong statistical significance.
In contrast, six other variables suggested by the Committee did not illustrate
significance.

Those variables not exhibiting significance were agricultural loans,

construction loans, real estate loans, economic conditions, and changes in agricultural
loans and real estate loans.
Another area o f interest was the amount o f the variance of loan losses explained
by the AICPA model. When the thirteen model variables were regressed on loan losses,
13.8 percent o f the variability was explained. All the variables but construction loans and
changes in construction, real estate, and agricultural loans exhibited significance.
When the trend variable was introduced, the coefficient of one o f the variables
changed sign. This change usually indicates a mild case o f multicollinearity.
By adding regulation and size to the model, the amount of explained variance was
increased by 10 percent more than that explained by the AICPA model alone. Since trend
variables cannot "explain" variance, the trend variable was not included in this calculation.
This chapter has presented the findings o f this study. The following chapter,
Chapter V, provides a summary o f the study, conclusions drawn from the findings, and
implications for future research.
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CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Recently, a significant number of banks have become insolvent.

A major

contributor to this trend has been the inability o f the banks to collect outstanding loans.
Frequently, external auditors of these failed institutions have been sued by investors and
creditors. A major accusation o f these litigations has been that auditors incorrectly
determined the net realizable value of the loan portfolio. The major factor involved in this
determination is the Allowance for Loan Losses (ALL).
Regulators from the Office o f the Comptroller o f the Currency and members of the
Banking Committee from the AICPA have exhibited a keen interest in how the ALL is
measured. Factors that influence loan losses, both internal and external, have been
examined for possible significance. Models involving these factors have been suggested
as areas o f interest for auditors.

Statement of the Problem
In the auditing profession, performance o f the audit must be performed both
efficiently and effectively. If not efficient, the audit will come in "over budget" causing
reduced net income to the audit firm and the potential for other difficulties.
79
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effective, the audit can result in litigation for the audit firm, especially if the client becomes
insolvent.
While bank regulators have mandated that an adequate ALL be established, no
definite method has been identified as a preferred procedure. In contrast, the AICPA
Banking Committee (1986, 13-14) has suggested that certain factors should be examined
when auditing the ALL. To date, no research has been found that tested these factors in
a composite model to determine their reliability in explaining loan losses.
Other factors suggested by the AICPA Audit Committee (1989, 260) as
prerequisites in studying internal control environments were regulation and size. These
factors were not included in the normative model for ALL determination by the AICPA
Banking Committee.
In conjunction with the internal control environment, size has also been featured
in numerous studies in attempts to determine the existence o f an economy of scale in the
banking environment. No previous research has been found that attempted to determine
an economy o f scale by contrasting asset size with loan losses.
The primary purpose o f this study was to determine whether size and regulation
help explain loan losses in addition to the factors suggested by the AICPA Banking
Committee. A second purpose was to determine if loan losses could be used to determine
if an economy of scale is present in banking. Finally, the factors suggested by the Banking
Committee were assessed for statistical significance to determine which factors, if any,
contribute to loan loss determination.
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Summary of Methodology
Financial and economic data for 236 national banks for the years 1991-1993
comprised the primary data for this study. Data for 13 variables suggested by the AICPA
Banking Committee were collected from SheshunofF s Information Service: The Bank
Quarterly: Ratings and Analysis and from the U.S. Bureau o f Labor Statistics database:
LAB STAT. as well as two variables suggested by the AICPA Professional Standards and
one statistical variable.
Tests for normality o f distribution were performed to determine the most
appropriate statistical procedure to utilize in analyzing the data. Alter discovering that the
data were not normally distributed, rank transformation o f the data was performed as
suggested by Conover (1980, 337).

The transformed data was then examined for

heterogeneity o f slopes to determine whether analysis o f covariance (ANCOVA) could be
used to examine statistically the data. Only four of the variables were found to have non
parallel slopes. The small number of heterogeneous slopes and the large data set (2832
observations) were influential factors, along with the robustness o f the ANCOVA model
as reported by Shields (1973, 28), in determining the appropriateness o f ANCOVA for
statistical analysis o f the data.
ANCOVA was utilized to test for statistical relationships between size, regulation,
AICPA variables, and loan losses. Four subsamples o f national banks were examined.
One group was composed o f banks that were affiliated with large holding companies. The
second group o f banks were affiliated with small holding companies. Each o f these two
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groups was subdivided into equal numbers o f medium and small banks. Results o f these
comparisons are summarized in the following section.

Summary o f Findings
A summation of the findings of this study on loan losses in national banks is
discussed in the order of presentation utilized in Chapter IV. First, findings regarding
possible interaction between regulation requiring annual audits and banks size are
discussed as to the effect on loan losses. Second, the results o f an examination into
whether regulation requiring an independent audit affects loan losses follows. This
examination is succeeded by a discussion o f whether bank size determines loan losses.
Next, an examination into whether loan losses can determine the existence of an economy
of scale in banking. The summary concludes with an inspection of the possible association
of loan losses and the covariates suggested by the AICPA is inspected.
The findings of this study indicate that the interaction of regulation and size does
not statistically affect loan losses in national banks. The lack of an interaction allows the
further study o f whether the main effects o f size and regulation are statistically significant.
Had the interaction been significant, only simple effects could have been explored.
Findings are that regulation of national banks requiring an annual audit by a CPA
is not statistically significant. The association o f regulation and loan losses exhibits a low
level of correlation at the .05 level of significance.
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This study found that bank size as measured by total assets is a significant
determinant of loan losses in national banks. Size added 10 percent more to the explained
variability when added to the AICPA model.
Previous studies had disagreed about the existence of an economy of scale in
banking. This finding appears to support those who argue against an economy o f scale.
In a comparison o f small to medium LHC member banks, medium banks were
found to have significantly larger loan losses. Larger loan losses in medium banks were
also found when contrasting small to medium SHC member banks.
Findings are that eight out o f 14 covariate variables exhibited statistical significance
at a .05 alpha level. Variables exhibiting statistical significance in determining bank loan
losses are (1) the trend variable, (2) management quality, (3) problem loans, (4) changes
in delinquent loans, (5) changes in consumer loans, (6) changes in construction loans,
(7) previous loss experience, and (8) consumer loans.
In addition, Beta Weights were calculated for the eight predictor variables and the
trend variable. Hatcher and Stepanski (1994,431) stated "Beta Weights are the regression
coefficient that would be obtained if all the variables were standardized, so that they had
the same standard deviations." As illustrated in Table XIII, the trend variable has the
largest Beta Weight coefficient, followed closely by management quality and problem
loans. Bank size and changes in delinquent loans also contribute significant amounts to
the model. Changes in consumer loans and construction loans, previous loss experience
and consumer loans make equal marginal contributions to the explanation of loan losses.
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TABLE X m
COMPOSITE MODEL
Param eter

F Value

PR> F

1. Trend Variable
2. Management Quality
3. Problem Loans
4. Size

261.36
75.94
41.46
43.91

0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001

.287
-.188
.145
.119

Changes in:
5. Delinquent Loans
6. Consumer Loans
7. Construction Loans

24.09
7.65
6.92

0.0001
0.0057
0.0086

-.085
.047
-.044

5.74
5.54

0.0166
0.0187

.043
.041

8. Previous Loss Experience
9. Consumer Loans

Beta Weights*

*Beta Weights are standardized multiple regression coefficients obtained when
loan losses were regressed on the eight predictor variables and the trend variable.

The findings further indicated that construction loans, real estate loans, agricultural
loans, economic conditions, and changes in real estate loans and agricultural loans were
not statistically significant in explaining bank loans.

Conclusions
The research questions formulated at the inception o f the study serve as the basis for
the derivation of the conclusions. The five questions that follow will be examined in
separate paragraphs.
1. Does regulation affect loan loss recognition in national banks?
This question was addressed by determining if a difference existed in loan losses
between small SHC member banks and small LHC banks.

Also addressed was the
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determination o f a difference between medium SHC member banks and medium LHC
member banks. ANCOVA indicated no difference between either set o f banks. Thus, it
was concluded that regulation which required an annual audit does not result in a
difference in loan losses between either sets of banks.
A possible explanation o f this result is that banks may have begun to substitute
audit fees for examiner fees. This area invites further investigation into this phenomena.
2. Is there a difference in loan loss recognition by national banks within LHC's due to
bank size?
This question was addressed by determining whether a difference existed between
small and medium LHC member banks. ANCOVA illustrated a large statistical difference
between the means o f the two different size LHC member banks. Thus, the conclusion is
that asset size does serve to explain loan losses in LHC member banks.
Demsetz and Strahan (1995, 15-18) suggested that large companies have greater
leverage and are engaging in riskier activities. This explanation might explain the greater
losses incurred by medium banks as compared to small banks. As the medium banks seek
riskier returns, they incur increased loan losses as well.
3. Is there a difference in loan loss recognition by national banks within SHCs due to
bank size?
This question was addressed by an examination to determine if a difference exists in
loan loss recognition between small and medium SHC member banks. The results from
the use o f ANCOVA illustrate that a statistical difference was discovered between small
and medium SHC banks. A conclusion was determined from this finding that size does
serve to explain loan losses in SHC member banks.
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From these conclusions, size appears to be a variable that an auditor would use if
he was constructing a predictive model for loan loss determination A definite appearance
o f necessity is indicated for an aggregate model variable.
4. Do size and regulation interact in the determination o f loan losses in national banks?
This question was addressed by an investigation to determine if a difference in loan
loss recognition exists between small LHC member banks and medium SHC member
banks, as well as between small SHC member banks and medium LHC member banks.
Interactions are dependent upon the statistical significance o f main effects. The results
from ANCOVA illustrated the lack of significance o f both regulation and the
size/regulation interaction. Therefore, the conclusion is that asset size and audit regulation
do not interact to affect loan losses in national banks.
5. Do the variables suggested by the AICPA Banking Committee explain loan losses in
national banks?
To address this question, ANCOVA was used to determine which o f the variables
exhibited statistical significance. The findings indicated that seven o f the thirteen variables
suggested by the AICPA Banking Committee were statistically significant in the
determination of loan losses. The conclusion was that consumer loans, previous loss
experience, problem loans, management quality, and changes in construction loans,
consumer loans and delinquent loans were useful in explaining loan losses in national
banks.
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Also, the significance of the trend variable indicated that unknown relevant
variables were omitted from the study. Determination of these variables was not feasible
from this research.
It was not possible to determine any positive conclusions from the selected sample
concerning the relationships, if any, between loan losses and construction loans, real estate
loans, agricultural loans, economic conditions, or changes in real estate loans and
agricultural loans.

Implications for Further Research
Hendriksen (1982,10-14) states that "normative theories attempt to prescribe what
data ought to be communicated and how they ought to be presented; that is they attempt
to explain what should be rather than what is" (Hendriksen’s emphasis). He furthers this
argument by stating that they "are always difficult to evaluate and must always be subject
to change as new information is obtained."

In the audit guide for determining the

allowance for loan losses, the AICPA described a normative model to be followed by bank
auditors. This study was an attempt to test and possibly explain this model.
Both audit practitioners and academics may benefit from the findings of this study.
The efficiency and effectiveness of audits can be improved by auditors who utilize the
results. In addition, theorists could advance accounting theory by adjusting earlier
normative theory.
Because of the exploratory nature o f this research, several areas were examined.
Each area could have expanded investigations conducted upon it. One example is that o f

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

88

asset size effect on loan losses. Many questions concerning size remain unresolved by this
study, such as the following:
1. Are large banks more efficient at making and collecting loans than small and medium
banks?
2. Do large banks employ better management than do medium or small banks?
3. Does the asset size o f a bank influence the portfolio selection?
Answers to these questions will come from future research conducted by those
directly affected. Certainly, the Banking Committee o f the AICPA, as well as the Office
o f the Comptroller of the Currency, should have an interest in these areas.
Another area worthy of future research involves the methodology used in this
study. Analysis o f covariance has seen little use by either academics or practitioners. The
additional precision gained by using ANCOVA could give added benefits to studies
conducted using simple analysis o f variance.
A final suggestion for future research is the consideration of size and efficiency on
acquired banks. With the explosion of bank acquisitions and mergers that have occurred
recently, a relevant research area to be explored would be the effect on efficiency o f
acquired banks as compared to pre-acquisition banks.
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AND DISPERSION
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Small SHC Member Banks

VARIABLE
Loan Losses1
Composition of
Loan Portfolio2
Construction Loans
Real Estate Loans
Consumer Loans
Agriculture Loans
Trends in Loan Volume
& Delinquencies3
Construction Loans
Real Estate Loans
Consumer Loans
Agriculture Loans
Delinquent Loans4
Other Factors
Problem Loans5
Econ. Conditions5
Mgt. Quality7
Previous Loss &
Recovery*
Trend Variable

MEAN

STD DEV MINIMUM

MAXIMUM

0.24

0.44

-0.39

3.65

4.12
11.30
26.34
2.35

6.30
7.36
12.55
5.43

0.00
0.00
1.00
0.00

51.00
43.00
65.00
43.00

1.40
2.26
0.11
0.59
0.51

35.20
19.64
11.69
22.32
49.54

-100.00
-86.70
-75.00
-100.00
-100.00

100.00
100.00
71.40
100.00
100.00

1.29
7.23
36.46

1.66
2.72
25.76

0.00
2.60
0.00

11.97
22.20
98.00

0.25
342.00

0.44
111.89

-0.39
191.00

3.65
493.00

‘measured as a percentage of average loans
Measured as a percentage of total assets
3measured as the change in percentage of total assets
4measured as the change in percentage of nonaccrual loans vs gross loans
5measured as the nonaccrual loans as a percentage o f gross loans
6measured as the change in county/parish unemployment rates
’measured by President’s weighting: a Sheshunoff statistic
'measured by quarterly loan losses as a percentage of average assets lagged one
quarter
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Medium SHC Member Banks

VARIABLE

MEAN

STD DEV

0.31

0.50

-0.58

3.92

Composition of
Loan Portfolio2
Construction Loans
Real Estate Loans
Consumer Loans
Agriculture

2.70
12.94
31.05
1.40

4.13
6.51
12.57
2.87

0.00
1.00
3.00
0.00

27.00
38.00
62.00
20.00

Trends in Loan Volume
& Delinquencies3
Construction Loans
Real Estate Loans
Consumer Loans
Agriculture Loans
Delinquent Loans4

-1.90
1.88
-0.29
-0.12
0.99

33.02
15.32
10.87
20.55
39.46

-100.00
-83.30
-91.20
-100.00
-100.00

100.00
88.90
90.90
100.00
100.00

1.43
7.37
45.54

1.86
2.83
32.29

0.00
2.20
0.00

14.86
27.80
98.00

0.31
342.00

0.50
111.89

-0.58
191.00

3.92
493.00

Loan Losses1

Other Factors
Problem Loans5
Econ. Conditions®
Mgt. Quality7
Previous Loss &
Recovery*
Trend

MINIMUM MAXIMUM

Measured as a percentage o f average loans
2measured as a percentage o f total assets
3measured as the change in percentage o f total assets
4measured as the change in percentage o f nonaccrual loans vs gross loans
Smeasured as the nonaccrual loans as a percentage of gross loans
6measured as the change in county/parish unemployment rates
7measured by President’s weighting: a SheshunofFstatistic
'measured by quarterly loan losses as a percentage of average assets lagged one
quarter
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Small LHC Member Banks

VARIABLE

MEAN

STD DEV

0.22

0.56

-1.14

5.09

Composition of
Loan Portfolio2:
Construction Loans
Real Estate Loans
Consumer Loans
Agriculture Loans

1.42
8.03
28.38
5.38

2.03
6.02
14.41
7.07

0.00
0.00
5.00
0.00

12.00
41.00
65.00
29.00

Trends in Loan Volume
& Delinquencies3
Construction Loans
Real Estate Loans
Consumer Loans
Agriculture Loans
Delinquent Loans4

-0.33
0.88
0.11
1.20
-2.33

35.90
17.99
9.70
20.29
7.20

-100.00
-64.70
-50.00
-100.00
-100.00

100.00
100.00
59.30
100.00
100.00

Loan Losses1

MINIMUM MAXIMUM

O ther Factors
0.00
0.94
1.85
20.68
Problem Loans5
1.60
19.20
2.92
Econ. Conditions
6.92
23.81
2.00
98.00
Mgt. Quality
54.48
Previous Loss &
-1.14
Recovery8
0.22
0.56
5.09
111.89
191.00
493.00
Trend
342.00
‘measured as a percentage o f average loans
Measured as a percentage o f total assets
3measured as the change in percentage of total assets
4measured as the change in percentage of nonaccrual loans vs gross loans
Smeasured as the nonaccrual loans as a percentage o f gross loans
^measured as the change in county/parish unemployment rates
’measured by President’s weighting: a SheshunofFstatistic
'measured by quarterly loan losses as a percentage of average assets lagged one
quarter
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Medium LHC Member Banks

VARIABLE

MEAN

STD DEV

MINIMUM

MAXIMUM

0.30

0.46

-0.63

3.81

Composition of
Loan Portfolio2
Construction Loans
Real Estate Loans
Consumer Loans
Agriculture Loans

1.67
9.71
34.12
2.04

1.93
5.36
13.57
3.87

0.00
1.00
7.00
0.00

13.00
40.00
68.00
22.00

Trends in Loan Volume
& Delinquencies3
Construction Loans
Real Estate Loans
Consumer Loans
Agriculture Loans
Delinquent Loans4

0.12
0.97
0.58
-0.22
-2.00

34.64
16.79
8.01
15.78
39.30

-100.00
-91.20
-72.20
-100.00
-100.00

100.00
100.00
40.00
100.00
100.00

1.07
6.99
52.53

1.05
2.29
25.71

0.00
1.90
2.00

6.64
17.30
98.00

0.30
342.00

0.46
111.89

-0.63
191.00

3.81
493.00

Loan Losses1

O ther Factors
Problem Loans5
Econ. Conditions
Mgt. Quality
Previous Loss &
Recovery8
Trend

‘measured as a percentage of average assets
Measured as a percentage of total assets
3measured as the change in percentage o f total assets
4measured as the change in percentage o f nonaccrual loans vs gross loans
Smeasured as the nonaccrual loans as a percentage o f gross loans
6measured as the change in county/parish unemployment rates
’measured by President’s weighting: a Sheshunoff statistic
'measured by quarterly loan losses as a percentage o f average assets lagged one
quarter
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RANKED ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE
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Ranked Analysis of Covariance
SOURCE
MODEL
ERROR
CORRECTED
TOTAL
R-SQUARE
0.216969

DF

SUM OF
SQUARES

MEAN
SQUARE

16
2814
2830

410158918.2
480248023.7
1890406941.9

25634932.4
526029.9

C.V.
51.18824

ROOT MSE
725.2792

FVALUE

PR > F

48.73

0.0001

LOAN LOSS MEAN
1416.886
FVALUE

PR > F

305869.7
19525783.1

0.58
37.12

0.4458
0.0001

COMPOSITION OF LOAN PORTFOLIO:
Construction
1
532968.5
532968.5
253.7
I
253.7
Real Estate
Consumer
1
2830072.3
2830072.3
1562857.9
1
1562857.9
Agriculture

1.01
0.00
5.38
2.97

0.3142
0.9825
0.0204
0.0849

TRENDS (CHANGES! IN LOAN VOLUME AND DELINQUENCIES:
Construction
1
3887077.1
3887077.1
7.39
431372.8
Real Estate
1
431372.8
0.82
Consumer
1
3837116.2
3837116.2
7.29
1
151830.2
151830.2
Agriculture
0.29
1 12638677.0
12638677.0
Delinquent
24.03

0.0066
0.3652
0.0070
0.5911
0.0001

SOURCE

DF TYPE HISS MEAN SQUARE

REGULATION & SIZE EFFECTS:
Regulation
I
305869.7
I 19525783.1
Size

POTENTIAL PROBLEM LOANS AND RESULTS OF REGULATORY EXAMS:
22524527.0
0.0001
1 22524527.0
42.82
Prob. Loans
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS:
Local
1
797248.2
Unemployment

1.52

0.2184

EXPERIENCE. COMPETENCE & DEPTH OF MANAGEMENT:
28697204.0
Management
1 28697204.0
54.55

0.0001

PREVIOUS LOSS & RECOVERY EXPERIENCE:
Previous Loss
Experience
1
3144411.7
3144411.7

5.98

0.0145

253.71

0.0001

TREND:

1 133459888.0

797248.2

133459888.0
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Unranked Analysis of Covariance
DEPENDENT VARIABLE; Loan Losses

SOURCE

DF

MODEL
16
ERROR
2814
CORRECTED 2830
TOTAL
R-SQUARE
0.236534
SOURCE

SUM OF
SQUARES

MEAN
SQUARE

162.9462469
525.9443600
688.8906070

10.1841404
0.1869028

ROOT MSE
0.432323

C.V.
159.7871
DF

type

m ss

FVALUE

PR> F

54.49

0.0001

LOAN LOSS MEAN
0.270562

MEAN SQUARE FVALUE

PR> F

REGULATION & SIZE EFFECTS:
Regulation
1
1.51066643
Size
1
2.71430099

1.51066643
2.71430099

8.08
14.52

0.0045
0.0001

COMPOSITION OF LOAN PORTFOLIO:
Construction
1
0.30239822
Real Estate
1
0.00141704
Consumer
1
0.01440005
0.04753940
Agriculture
1

0.30239822
0.00141704
0.01440005
0.04753940

1.62
0.01
0.08
0.25

0.2035
0.9306
0.7814
0.6141

TRENDS (CHANGES! IN LOAN VOLUME AND DELINQUENCIES:
1.20
0.22375897
Construction
1
0.22375897
0.29
0.05428249
Real Estate
1
0.05428249
0.51
0.09541453
Consumer
1
0.09541453
0.59
0.10964568
Agriculture
1
0.10964568
16.55
3.09312076
3.09312076
Delinquent
I

0.2740
0.5900
0.4750
0.4438
0.0001

POTENTIAL PROBLEM LOANS AND RESULTS OF REGULATORY EXAMS:
155.08
0.0001
Problem
I
28.98496170 28.98496170
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS:
Local
1
Unemployment

0.02

0.8773

EXPERIENCE. COMPETENCE & DEPTH OF MANAGEMENT:
88.09
Management
1
16.46383297 16.46383297

0.0001

PREVIOUS LOSS & RECOVERY EXPERIENCE:
Previous Loss
6.50163240
6.50163240
Experience
1

34.79

0.0001

37.07139524

198.35

0.0001

Trend

1

0.00445835

37.07139524

0.00445835
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Medium Size LHC Member Banks
(Page 1 o f 2)
C ITY

C O U N TY /PA R ISH

STA TE

B A N K NAM E

CULLMAN

Cullman

AL

SouthTrust Bank of Cullman, NA

FLORENCE

Lauderdale

AL

FNB of Florence

OPP

Covington

AL

SouthTrustBank of Covington County, NA

ELDORADO

Union

AR

The First National Bank o f El Dorado

PHOENIX

Maricopa

AZ

Northern Trust Bank o f Arizona, NA

ALAMEDA

Alameda

CA

Alameda FNB

PLEASANTON

Alameda

CA

Community FNB

DENVER

Denver

CO

FNB Southeast Denver

FORT COLLINS

Larimer

CO

1st Interstate Bank o f Fort Collins, NA

WASHINGTON

DC

DC

Citizens Bank o f Washington, NA

HOBE SOUND

Martin

FL

Barnett Bank o f M artin County, NA

NAPLES

Collier

FL

Sun Bank/Naples, NA

TALLAHASSEE

Leon

FL

Sun Bank/Tallahassee

AUGUSTA

Richmond

GA

Trust Co. Bank o f Augusta, NA

BRUNSWICK

Glenn

GA

Barnett Bank of Southeast Georgia, NA

CORNELIA

Habersham

GA

FNB of Habersham

SAVANNAH

Chatham

GA

Trust Co. of Ga. Bank of Savannah, NA

BELLEVILLE

S t Clair

IL

Boatmen's National Bank o f Belleville

CHARLESTON

Coles

IL

Boatmen’s National Bank o f Charleston

DOWNERS GROVE

DuPage

IL

Citizens National Bank of Downers Grove

MOLINE

Rock Island

IL

First Midwest Bank/Western Illinois, NA

ROCK ISLAND

Rock Island

IL

FIRST OF AMERICA Bank-Quad Cities, NA

EVANSVILLE

Vanderburgh

IN

The National City Bank of Evansville

MARION

Grant

IN

Bank One, Marion, IN, NA

WARSAW

Kosciusko

IN

FNB of Warsaw

LAFAYE'ITE

Lafayette

LA

The FNB o f Lafayette

LAKE CHARLES

Calcasieu

LA

The FNB o f Lake Charles

LEONARDTOWN

S t Mary's

MD

The FNB of S t Mary's at Leonardtown

FENTON

Genesee

MI

Bank One, Fenton, NA

MARQUETTE

Marquette

MI

1st of America Bank-Upp. Peninsula, NA

ST. CLOUD

Steams

MN

The First American N. B. o f SL Cloud

CAPE GIRARDEAU

Cape Girardeau

MO

Boatmen's N.B. o f Cape Girardeau

JOPLIN

Jasper

MO

Mercantile Bank of Joplin, NA

JOPLIN

Jasper

MO

Commerce Bank of Joplin, NA
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Medium Size LHC Member Banks
(Page 2 o f 2)
CITY

COUNTY/PARISH

BILLINGS

Yellowstone

STATE

BANK NAME

MT

Norwest Bank Billings, NA

GREAT FALLS

Cascade

MT

Norwest Bank Great Falls, NA

HELENA

Lewis & Clark

MT

Norwest Bank Helena, NA

COLUMBUS

Platte

NE

FNB & TC o f Columbus

CLOVIS

Curry

NM

Sunwest Bank o f Clovis, NA

SANTA FE

SanteFe

M

First Interstate Bank o f New Mexico, NA

GLENS FALLS

Warren

NY

Glens Falls National Bank & Trust Co.

CAMBRIDGE

Guernsey

OH

Bank One, Cambridge, NA

FREMONT

Sandusky

OH

Bank One, Fremont, NA

PORTSMOUTH

Scioto

OH

Bank One, Portsmouth, NA

STEUBENVILLE

Jefferson

OH

Bank One, Steubenville, NA

DANVILLE

Montour

PA

The FNB OF Danville

GREENCASTLE

Franklin

PA

Citizens N.B. of Southern Penn.

STATE COLLEGE

Centre

PA

The People's N.B. o f Central Penn.

CROSSVILLE

Cumberland

TN

The FNB of Crossville

KNOXVILLE

Knox

TN

National Bank of Commerce (NBC)

SHELBYVILLE

Bedford

TN

FNB of Shelbyville

GALVESTON

Galveston

TX

The U. S. National Bank of Galveston

HOUSTON

Harris

TX

Charter National Bank - Colonial

HOUSTON

Harris

TX

Charter National Bank - Houston

NACOGDOCHES

Nacogdoches

TX

Stone Fort National Bank

SHAWANO

Shawano

WI

Valley Bank of Shawano, NA

BLUEF1ELD

Mercer

WV

The Flat Top National Bank of Bluefield

FAIRMONT

Marion

WV

City National Bank o f Fairmont

CLARKSBURG

Harrison

WV

The Empire National Bank of Clarksburg
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Medium Size SHC Member Banks
(Page 1 of 2)
C IT Y

C O U N TY /PA R ISH

STA TE

B A N K NAM E

HUNTINGTON BEACH

Orange

CA

Huntington National Bank

LOS ANGELES

Los Angeles

CA

Marathon National Bank

NEWPORT BEACH

Orange

CA

Pacific National Bank

ORANGE

Orange

CA

Orange National Bank

RANCHO CUCAMONGA

San Bernardino

CA

Vineyard National Bank

SACRAMENTO

Sacramento

CA

Sacramento FNB

SAN DIEGO

San Diego

CA

San Diego National Bank

SANTA MONICA

Los Angeles

CA

First Professional Bank NA

VISALIA

Tulare

CA

Mineral King National Bank

NAPLES

Collier

FL

Citizens National Bank o f Naples

DECATUR

DeKalb

GA

Fidelity National Bank

GRIFFIN

Spalding

GA

FNB of Griffin

MOULTRIE

Colquitt

GA

Moultrie National Bank

HONOLULU

Honolulu

HI

Hawaii National Bank

IOWA CITY

Johnson

IA

FNB, Iowa City, Iowa

CHAMPAIGN

Champaign

IL

The Champaign National Bank

GENESEO

Henry

IL

The Farmers National Bank of Geneseo

MOLINE

Rock Island

IL

FNB of Moline

TELL CITY

Perry

IN

The Citizens National Bank of Tell City

VINCENNES

Knox

IN

The American National Bank o f Vincennes

GRETNA

Jefferson

LA

FNB of Jefferson Parish

HOUMA

Terrebonne

LA

FNB of Houma

OAKLAND

Garrett

MD

First United NB & TC

DAMARISCOTTA

Lincoln

ME

The FNB ofDAMAISCOTTA

STARKVILLE

Oktibbeha

MS

National Bank o f Commerce of Miss

ASHEBORO

Randolph

NC

First National Bank & Trust Co.

BRANCHVILLE

Sussex

NJ

The National Bank o f Sussex County

UNION

Union

NJ

The Union Center National Bank

BATH

Steuben

NY

The Bath National Bank

BRIDGEHAMPTON

Suffolk

NY

The Bridgehampton National Bank

CANANDAIGUA

Ontario

NY

The Canada!gua National Bank & Tr. Co.

CORTLAND

Cortland

NY

FNB OF Cortland

EAST HAMPTON

Suffolk

NY

The Bank of the Hamptons NA

GLOVERSVILLE

Fulton

NY

City National Bank &. Tr. Co.
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RHINEBECK

Dutchess

NY

The FNB OF Rhinebeck

ST. CLAIRSVILLE

Belmont

OH

Belmont National Bank

WILMINGTON

Clinton

OH

The National Bank & Tr. Co.

ZANESVILLE

Muskigum

OH

The FNB OF Zanesville

BERWICK

Columbia

PA

The FNB of Berwick

BLOOMSBURG

Columbia

PA

Columbia County Fanners National Bank

CUMBERLAND TWP

Adams

PA

Adams County National Bank

JERMYN

Lackawanna

PA

The FNB of Jermyn

JOHNSTOWN

Cambria

PA

The Moxham National Bank o f Johnstown

LATROBE

Westmoreland

PA

Commercial N. B. of Westmoreland County

LEESPORT

Burks

PA

The FNB of Leesport

MOUNT JOY

Lancaster

PA

The Union National ML Joy Bank

NAZARETH

Northampton

PA

Nazareth National Bank & Tr. Co.

PHILADELPHIA

Philadelphia

PA

Regent National Bank

POTTSVILLE

Scuylkill

PA

The Miners National Bank

WESTCHESTER

Chester

PA

The FNB of West Chester

ROCK HILL

York

SC

Rock Hill National Bank

COLUMBIA

Maury

TN

First F. & M National Bank o f Columbia

MCMINNVILLE

Warren

TN

The FNB o f McMinnville

FORT WORTH

Tarrant

TX

Summit National Bank

MARSHALL

Harrison

TX

First National Bank

FREDERICKSBURG

Spotsylvania

VA

The National Bank of Fredericksburg

KILMARNOCK

Lancaster

VA

Chesapeake National Bank

DERBY

Orleans

VT

Community National Bank

ELKINS

Randolph

WV

Citizens National Bank o f Elkins

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

104
Small Size LHC M ember Banks
(Page 1 of 2)
C IT Y

C O U N T Y /PA R ISH

STA TE

B A N K NAM E

ANCHORAGE

SouthcenL D ist

AK

F irst Interstate Bank o f Alaska, NA

FORT RUCKER

Dale

AL

Fort Rucker National Bank

ASHDOWN

Little River

AR

The FNB in Ashdown

CAMDEN

Ouachita

AR

M erchants & Planters Bank, NA

CHANDLER

Maricopa

AZ

F irst American National Bank

MILPITAS

Santa Clara

CA

The Bank of Milpitas, NA

AURORA

Arapahoe

CO

FNB o f Arapahoe

IGNACIO

La Plata

CO

United Bank of Ignacio, NA

WASHINGTON

DC

DC

Security Trust Co., NA

MONTICELLO

Jefferson

FL

FNB o f Jefferson County

PALM BEACH

Palm Beach

FL

Morgan Trust Co. of FL, NA

QUINCY

Gadsden

FL

Gadsden National Bank

TALLAHASSEE

Leon

FL

City National Bank

TARPON SPRINGS

Pinellas

FL

F irst National Bank

COLUMBUS

Muscogee

GA

SouthTrust Bank of Columbus, NA

JEFFERSON

Jackson

GA

The FNB of Jackson County

CENTERVILLE

Appanoose

IA

Hawkeye Bank of Centerville, NA

BATAVIA

Kane

JL

Harris Bank Batavia, NA

ELK GROVE VILLAGE

Cook

IL

Suburban N.B. of Elk Grove Village

GRAYVILLE

White

IL

The Peoples National Bank o f Grayville

WILMETTE

Cook

IL

Harris Bank Wilmette, NA

LAWRENCEBURG

Anderson

KY

The Lawrenceburg National Bank

SCOTTSVILLE

Allen

KY

The Fanners N. B. of Scottsville

SHELBYVILLE

Shelby

KY

Liberty N. Bank of Shelbyville

OCEAN CITY

Worchester

MD

Atlantic National Bank

EAST GRAND FORKS

Polk

MN

FNB o f E. Grand Forks

MARSHALL

Lyon

MN

Community FNB

WHEATON

Traverse

MN

Community FNB of Wheaton

HANNIBAL

Marion

MO

Commerce Bank o f Hannibal, NA
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LEBANON

Laclede

MO

Boatmen’s National Bank o f Lebanon

MONTGOMERY CITY

Montgomery

MO

Merc. Bk. of Montgomery City, NA

LEWISTOWN

Fergus

MT

Norwest Bank Lewistown, NA

LIDERWOOD

Richland

ND

Community FNB of Liderwood

WAHPETON

Richland

ND

C om m unity FNB o f Wahpeton

MCCOOK

Red Willow

NE

The FNB OF McCook

NORTH PLATTE

Lincoln

NE

North Platt National Bank

WEST POINT

Cuming

NE

The FNB of West Point

LAS CRUCES

Dona Ana

NM

Sunwest Bank of Las Cruces, NA

PORTALES

Roosevelt

NM

United New Mexico Bk at Portales,

RIO RANCHO

Sandoval

NM

Sunwest Bk of Sandoval County, NA

SOCORRO

Socorro

NM

United New Mexico Bank at Socorro,

SARATOGA SPRINGS

Saratoga

NY

Saratoga NB & TC

LANSFORD

Carbon

PA

The Citizens N. B. of Lansford

SPRING GROVE

York

PA

The Spring Grove National Bank

NASHVILLE

Davidson

TN

First American Tr. Co., NA

ATLANTA

Cass

TX

The Atlanta National Bank

BORGER

Hutchinson

TX

First National Bank of Barger

CANYON

Randall

TX

The FNB in Canyon

EASTLAND

Eastland

TX

Eastland National Bank

POST

Garza

TX

The FNB of Post

FERRUM

Franklin

VA

The FNB of Ferrum

RICHLANDS

Tazewell

VA

The Richlands National Bank

SALTVUXE

Smyth

VA

The FNB of Saltville

GENOA CITY

Walworth

WI

American NB. & Tr. Co. o f Wise.

HARTLAND

Waukesha

WI

M & I Lake Country National Bank

RIPON

Fond Du Lac

WI

Valley First N. Bank of Ripon

BECKLEY

Raleigh

WV

First National Bank

HUNTINGTON

Cabell

WV

The Old N. Bank o f Huntington

MARLINTON

Pocahantas

WV

FNB in Marlinton

AUBURN

Placer

CA

The Bank of Commerce, NA

COMMERCE

Los Angeles

CA

Commerce National Bank

NAPA

Napa

CA

Napa National Bank
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SARATOGA

Santa Clara

CA

Saratoga National Bank

WASHINGTON

DC

DC

Adams National Bank

GEORGETOWN

Sussex

DE

Delaware National Bank

CAPE CORAL

Lee

FL

FNB of Southwest FL.

DADE CITY

Pasco

FL

FNB of Pasco

FT. MYERS

Lee

FL

Heritage National Bank

PONTE VEDRA

SL John’s

FL

Ponte Vedra National Bank

PORT ST. LUCIE

S t Lucie

FL

Port S t Lucie National Bank

STARKE

Bradford

FL

FNB of Bradford County

VENICE

Sarasota

FL

C om m unity N. Bank of Sarasota County

WINTER PARK

Orange

FL

National Bank of Commerce

ASHBURN

Turner

GA

Community National Bank

ATLANTA

Fulton

GA

The Summit National Bank

DULUTH

Gwinnett

GA

Gwinnett National Bank

GAINESVILLE

Hall

GA

Lanier National Bank

JESUP

Wayne

GA

Wayne National Bank

PEACHTREE

Fayette

GA

Peachtree National Bank

SAVANNAH

Chatham

GA

AmeriBank NA

TUCKER

DeKalb

GA

Mountain National Bank

WOODSTOCK

Cherokee

GA

North Georgia National Bank

WOODSTOCK

Cherokee

GA

FNB of Cherokee

FAIRFIELD

Jefferson

IA

FNB in Fairfield

GALENA

Jo Daviess

IL

The FNB o f Galena

GENOA

DeKalb

IL

CITIZENS FNB - GENOA

LINTON

Greene

IN

Citizens' National Bank of Linton

MAYSVILLE

Mason

KY

The State National Bank of Maysville

LAFAYETTE

Lafayette

LA

MidSouth National Bank

DETROIT

Wayne

MI

First Independence N. Bank o f Detroit

LANSING

Ingham

MI

Capitol National Bank

L'ANSE

Baraga

MI

Commercial National Bank of L'Anse

C ITY
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ROGERS CITY

Presque Isle

MI

Huron National Bank

EUREKA

Lincoln

MT

FNB of Eureka

WHTTEFISH

Flathead

MT

The FNB o f Whitefish

ATCO

Camden

NJ

Equity National Bank

NEWARK

Essex

NJ

City National Bank of NJ

WESTMONT

Camden

NJ

Community National Bank of NJ

ATLANTA

Steuben

NY

Atlanta National Bank

CALDWELL

Noble

OH

The FNB o f Southeastern Ohio

OTTAWA

Putnam

OH

The FNB o f Ottawa

ROSEBURG

Douglas

OR

Douglas National Bank

EMLENTON

Venango

PA

The Fanners National Bank of Emlenton

LACEYVILLE

Wyoming

PA

The Grange N. B. o f Wy Cty at L-ville

ANDERSON

Anderson

SC

Anderson National Bank

CHARLESTON

Charleston

SC

Bank of Charleston, NA

GREENWOOD

Greenwood

SC

Greenwood National Bank

SPARTANBURG

Spartanburg

SC

Spartanburg National Bank

FRANKLIN

Williamson

TN

F ran k lin National Bank

KNOXVILLE

Knox

TN

FNB o f Knoxville

ABILENE

Taylor

TX

First State Bank, NA

FT. WORTH

Tarrant

TX

Alta Mesa National Bank

FT. WORTH

Tarrant

TX

Camp Bowie National Bank

ODESSA

Ector

TX

First State Bank, NA

STAMFORD

Jones

TX

The FNB in Stamford

REDMOND

King

WA

Redmond National Bank

MOOREFIELD

Hardy

WV

The S. Br. Valley N. B. ofM oorefield

PIEDMONT

Mineral

WV

First United Bank o f West Virginia, NA
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